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LIST OF ALL PARTIES IN THE DISTRICT COURT 
The following parties and attorneys appeared in the proceeding in the District 
Court: 
1. Appellants Silver Baron Partners, L.C., a Utah limited liability company, 
and Daedalus USA, Inc., a Utah Corporation, are represented by Joseph M. Chambers, 
Josh Chambers, and Maybell Romero, Harris, Preston & Chambers, LLP, Logan, Utah. 
2. Appellee Shamrock Plumbing LLC, a Utah limited liability company, is 
represented by Mel S. Martin, Murray, Utah, Matthew G. Cooper, Murray, Utah, and 
Jeremy C. Sink, McKay, Burton & Thurman, Salt Lake City, Utah. 
3. Other parties that were dismissed at earlier stages of this case and are not 
party to this appeal include White Cap Construction Supply; Star Mountain Construction; 
Ed Zite; Fred W. Fairclough Jr.; Christine Fairclough; Thomas Strebel; Idaho Pacific 
Lumber Co.; Bingglei Rock Products, Inc.; and Western States Equipment Co. 
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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Supreme Court had appellate jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to 
Utah Code Ann. § 78A-3-102(3)Q) and Utah R. App. P. 3 and 4. The Utah Court of 
Appeals now has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §§ 78A-3-
102(4) and 78A-4-103(2)Q). 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
Issue No, 1: Was Daedalus USA, Inc. ("Contractor ") entitled under the 
subcontract to withhold payment from Shamrock Plumbing, LLC ("Subcontractor")? 
Standard of Review: "When [...] a contract is unambiguous and can be 
interpreted as a matter of law, we review the district court's interpretation for correctness, 
according no deference to the district court." Mid-America Pipeline Co. v. Four-Four, 
Inc., 2009 UT 43, If 16, 216 P.3d 352 (citing Peterson v. Sunrider Corp., 2002 UT 43, t 
14, 48 P.3d 918). "'Questions of contract interpretation not requiring resort to extrinsic 
evidence are matters of law, and on such questions we accord the trial court's 
interpretation no presumption of correctness.'" Lloyd v. Lloyd, 2009 UT App 314, f^ 6, 
221 P.3d 884 (quoting Coalville City v. Lundgren, 930 P.2d 1206, 1209 (Utah Ct. App. 
1997)). "The district court's construction of contract language is given no particular 
weight and is reviewed for correctness as a matter of law." Doctors' Co. v. Drezga, 2009 
UT 60,19, 218 P.3d 598 (citing LDSHosp. v. Capitol Life Ins. Co., 765 P.2d 857, 858 
(Utah 1988)). 
Preservation: This issue was preserved in Appellants' Objection to Form and 
Content of Proposed Judgment and Request for Clarification of Ruling (R. 710-19); 
l 
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Appellants' Reply and Opposition Memorandum (R 750- 57); oral argument held April 6, 
2010 (R. 758; 902); the evidentiary hearing held June 11, 2010 (R. 777; 903); Objection 
to Content of Proposed Judgment (R. 790-93); and, more generally, at trial of this matter 
insofar as the court was asked to interpret and apply the contract in rendering its decision 
(seeR. 899-901). 
Issue No. 2: If Contractor was entitled under the subcontract to withhold 
payment from Subcontractor, is Subcontractor entitled to any pre-judgment interest? 
Can Subcontractor be awarded pre-judgment interest on the amount Contractor was 
entitled to withhold? 
Standard of Review: "The trial court's award of prejudgment interest, and the 
amount thereof, present [ ] a question of law which we review for correctness." 
Kealamakia, Inc. v. Kealamakia, 2009 UT App 148, Tf 4, 213 P.3d 13 (alteration in 
original)(internal citations and quotations omitted). "The trial court's decision on 
plaintiffs entitlement to prejudgment interest presents a question of law which we review 
for correctness." Andreason v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 848 P.2d 171, 177 (Utah App. 
1993). 
Preservation: This issue was preserved in Appellants' Objection to Form and 
Content of Proposed Judgment and Request for Clarification of Ruling (R. 710-19); 
Appellants' Reply and Opposition Memorandum (R 750- 57); oral argument held April 6, 
2010 (R. 758; 902); the evidentiary hearing held June 11, 2010 (R. 777; 903); Objection 
to Content of Proposed Judgment (R. 790-93); and, more generally, at trial of this matter 
2 
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insofar as the court was asked to interpret and apply the contract in rendering its decision 
(seeR. 899-901). 
Issue No. 3: Where expert witnesses were not identified or designated pursuant to 
Utah R. Civ. P. 26(a)(3)(A) and objections were timely raised at trial was it error for the 
trial court to admit such expert witness testimony? Were Appellants entitled to a new trial 
under Utah R. Civ. P. 59? 
Standard of Review: Interpretation of Utah R. Civ. P. 26, as well as the rest of 
"the Utah Rules of Civil procedure is a question of law that we review for correctness." 
Drew v. Lee, 2011 UT 15,17, 678 Utah Adv. Rep. 4; Pete v. Youngblood, 2006 UT App. 
303, f 7, 141 P.3d 629 (citing Goldberg v. Jay Timmons & Assocs., 896 P.2d 1241, 1242 
(Utah Ct. App. 1995)). "We review the trial court's impositions of sanctions for failure 
to comply with those rules, including the exclusion of testimony, for an abuse of 
discretion." Id. (citing Featherstone v. Schaerrer, 2001 UT 86, If 31, 34 P.3d 194; Tuck 
v. Godfrey, 1999 UT App 127, \ 15, 981 P.2d 407). "Under our rule 59, it is well settled 
that, as a general matter, the trial court has broad discretion to grant or deny a motion for 
a new trial. Under this standard of review, we will reverse only if there is no reasonable 
basis for the decision." Smith v. Fairfax Realty, Inc., 2003 UT 41, \ 25, 82 P.3d 1064 
(quoting Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exch., 817 P.2d 789, 804-05 (Utah 1991)). 
Preservation: This issue was preserved at trial (see, e.g., R. 899, pp. 91-95, 100, 
106-7, 112, 118, 135, 137, 192-93, 236, 241, 245, 251, 255, 86; see also generally R. 
899); in Appellants' Motion for New Trial and the accompany memorandum and 
declaration (R. 830-46); the Reply Memorandum and Request for Oral Argument (R. 
3 
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867-69); and the Objection to Admissibility of Exhibits, Testimony of Witnesses, and 
Use of Depositions (R. 629-40). 
STATEMENT OF APPLICABLE PROVISIONS 
Utah R. Civ. P. 26: Set forth in its entirety in App. C-1. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. NATURE OF THE CASE: This appeal involves the interpretation and 
enforcement of a construction contract (Ex. D-2; App. B-1). It is an appeal from the final 
orders and judgment of the Third District Court, Summit County, which awarded a 
monetary judgment for damages to Subcontractor against Contractor under the 
subcontract, and for damages and attorney fees to Subcontractor against Owner under 
Utah Code Ann. § 14-2-2. 
B. COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS AND DISPOSITION IN COURT 
BELOW: The case was filed in 2005 initially as a multi-party construction dispute 
arising from a construction project to build a luxury condominium hotel in Deer Valley, 
Utah. (R. 1-13.) All other parties have been dismissed except Subcontractor (Cross-
Claim Plaintiff/Appellee) and Owner and Contractor (Cross-Claim Defendants/ 
Appellants). 
On October 13, 2005, Subcontractor filed a Cross-Claim against Owner and 
Contractor. (R. 41-50.) The Cross-Claims alleged causes of action for mechanics' lien 
foreclosure, breach of contract, quantum meruit, and a claim under Utah Code Ann. § 14-
2-2. (Id.) The Subcontractor's mechanics' lien claim was dismissed on June 21, 2007. 
(R. 158-68.) 
4 
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On January 13, 2009, prior counsel for Owner and Contractor withdrew from the 
case. (R. 253-55.) Current Counsel for Owner and Contractor appeared March 23, 2009. 
(R. 296-97.) On May 14, 2009, Subcontractor filed a Notice of Readiness for Trial (R. 
337-79) and on May 21, 2009, Owner and Contractor objected to the Notice of Readiness 
and requested a Rule 16 Pretrial Conference. (R. 383-86.) The primary objection to the 
Notice of Readiness was that neither party had yet designated any expert witnesses for 
trial. {See R. 383-86, 401-03, 904.) Because the case involved a construction dispute, 
counsel for Owner and Contractor felt that proper presentation of the case would 
necessitate the use of expert witnesses. {See id.) The then-controlling scheduling order, 
entered before current counsel for Owner and Contractor became involved in the case, cut 
off discovery around December 31, 2008. (R. 229-30.) 
On July 21, 2009 the trial court conducted a pretrial conference. (R. 401-03.) 
Owner and Contractor's counsel requested that the court re-open discovery for the 
purposes of designating expert witnesses for use at trial and also to take two depositions 
that had been scheduled prior the discovery cutoff, but had been cancelled by prior 
counsel shortly before he withdrew. {See R. 401-03, 253-55, 904.) Subcontractor's 
counsel objected to re-opening discovery for purposes of designating expert witnesses, 
including the designation of Subcontractor's own expert witnesses. (R. 904, pp. 6-14.) 
All parties, and the trial court, were on notice that neither side was going to trial having 
any expert witness designated.1 {See R. 401-03, 904.) The trial court allowed the 
1
 Mr. Chambers (Owner's and Contractor's counsel): I don't think either side has 
designated an expert witness on the case. R. 904, p. 8. Mr. Martin (Subcontractor's 
5 
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Owner's and Contractor's counsel to take the depositions of Bret Christiansen (Colvin 
Engineering employee) and Bill Payne (Shamrock employee). (Id.) The trial court 
concluded the pretrial conference by establishing a cutoff date for dispositive motions 
and setting the matter for a four-day bench trial beginning January 20, 2010. (Id; R. 404-
06; 904, pp. 6-14. 
On October 20, 2009, Owner and Contractor filed a Motion for Partial Summary 
Judgment and Motion in Limine. (R. 432-450.) Both motions were opposed. (R. 469-
492.) On December 4, 2009 the trial court entered its Ruling and Order. (R. 530-543; 
see also App. A-l.) In its Ruling and Order, the trial court found: 
Thus, the motion for partial summary judgment is GRANTED in part and 
DENIED in part. The court finds and concludes as above, that the 
[Subcontractor's] work was not completed timely and that [Subcontractor] 
has breached the contract on that issue. The court finds and concludes also 
that [Subcontractor] did not give written notice of [design] deficiencies, 
that was a breach but the question of the materiality of that breach remains 
for trial. 
(R. 539-40.) The motion for partial summary judgment purportedly narrowed some of 
the issues (see R. 530-43), and the matter went to trial on January 20, 21 and 22, 2010 
(see R. 849-901). At the trial of this matter, over objections from Owner and Contractor, 
and to their prejudice, Subcontractor was allowed to introduce expert testimony from 
witnesses not designated as experts pursuant to Utah R. Civ. P. 26(a)(3)(A). (R. 899, pp. 
counsel): We're way passed, your honor, and neither side has designated an expert. R. 
904, p. 9. Mr. Chambers: What is the Court inclined to do about experts? R. 904, p. 13. 
The Court: (addressing Mr. Martin) You probably didn't do it because you don't see a 
need for one. Mr. Martin: There's no need, Your Honor. R. 904, p. 13. 
The Minutes of the Scheduling Conference also contains the following: "Discovery will 
not be opened for expert witnesses." R. 401. 
6 
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91-95, 100, 106-7, 192-93, 112, 118, 135, 137, 236, 241, 245, 251, 255, 86; ^  also 
generally R. 899.) 
On January 29, 2010, after the trial concluded, the trial court entered its decision 
in the form of a Memorandum Decision, awarding judgment to Subcontractor and against 
Contractor and Owner. (R. 665-93; see also App. A-2.) The trial court re-examined and 
changed its position with respect to one of the summary judgment rulings. (R. 678; App. 
A-2; cf. R. 530-43; App. A-l.) Post-trial proceedings were necessary based upon the 
Memorandum Decision. (R. 655-93; R. 902-03.) Additionally, each party filed their 
respective objections and a request for clarification of the trial court's memorandum 
decision. (R. 710-19; 730-43.) 
On June 11, 2010, the trial court conducted an evidentiary hearing. On June 18, 
2010 the trial court entered a Supplemental Memorandum Decision. (R. 781-789; see 
also App. A-3.) On July 27, 1010, the trial court entered a Judgment (R. 798-801) and 
later modified such on July 30, 2010 to two judgments - one for $237,518 as joint and 
several judgment and the other for $49,400 against Owner only.3 
On August 10, 2010 Owner and Contractor filed a motion for a new trial under 
Utah R. Civ. P. 59, raising again the issue of improper introduction of surprise expert 
The trial court's Memorandum Decision (R. 665-93) and Supplemental Memorandum 
Decision (R. 781-89) contain the formal Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law. 
These are identified as Judgments #4 and #5, respectively, in the trial court docket. 
These judgments were not included in the Clerk's Certificate of Proceedings, dated 
February 23, 2011. 
7 
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{ 
testimony. (R. 830-43.)4 The motion was denied on November 10, 2010. (R. 880-83.) 
Appellants timely filed their notice of appeal on December 10, 2010. (R. 888-90.) i 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Parties and Subcontract 
1. Appellant Silver Baron ("Owner") hired Appellant Daedalus as the general 
contractor ("Contractor") for the construction of a luxury condominium hotel in Deer 
Valley, Utah. (R. 669.) Contractor hired Appellee Shamrock Plumbing 
("Subcontractor") to perform all mechanical, plumbing, and HVAC work on the 
construction project. (Id.) The mechanical, plumbing and HVAC subcontract between
 { 
Contractor and Subcontractor was for $1,119,083. (R. 670; Ex. D-2; see also App. B-l.) 
The subcontract was signed June 7, 2004, but Subcontractor actually began work in April 
i 
2004. (R. 668-70.) 
2. Before the actual signing of the subcontract, Contractor went over the 
subcontract with Bill Payne, Subcontractor's representative, and emphasized time frames; { 
Contractor had a contract with Owner, which had a lease with Premier Resorts for 
occupancy of the units by December 1, 2004. (R. 669.) The subcontract provided that 
work was to commence April 26, 2004, and be substantially completed by September 20, 
2004. (R. 671.) The subcontract stated time was of the essence. (Id.) The subcontract 
also provided, at f 9, that contractor had the right to revise the subcontract schedule to 
4
 Judge Lubeck conducted all proceedings prior to the Motion for New Trial. Judge 
Lubeck was transferred to West Jordan and Judge Keith Kelly ruled on the Motion for 
New Trial. 
8 
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accommodate changes in conditions affecting the work. (Id.) Paragraph 3 of the 
subcontract provided that Subcontractor had examined all Contract Documents, which 
included the specifications and schedules relevant to performing the Subcontract work. 
(R. 669-71,677-78.) 
Boiler - Water Heater Venting System Design Incompatibility 
3. The subcontract provided, at ^ 10: 
In the event Subcontractor finds any design deficiency, error in 
measurements, or errors in the Contract Documents or conditions which 
Subcontractor believes to be at variance with approved plans, Subcontractor 
shall have an absolute duty to immediately provide written notice thereof to 
Contractor. Contractor shall have the right at any time to make changes to 
drawings and in the subcontract work. If any changes cause a material 
increase or decrease in the amount of work, Subcontractor agrees to accept 
any such changes subject to this paragraph and to proceed without delay in 
the Subcontract Work. Subcontractor shall submit a written claim for any 
required adjustment to the Contract Amount with a breakdown, supporting 
invoices and/or quotes. If Contractor or Subcontractor cannot agree on the 
amount of the addition or deletion, the dispute for adjustment shall be 
submitted to binding arbitration in Summit County, Utah, and 
Subcontractor shall nevertheless and unconditionally proceed with the 
material changes, if directed by Contractor during the pendency of 
arbitration. If Subcontractor makes such changes or any other changes to 
the Subcontract Work without written direction from Contractor, such 
changes constitutes an agreement by Subcontractor that it will not be paid 
for that changed work and Subcontractor shall be liable for any and all 
losses, costs, expenses, damages, and liability of any nature whatsoever 
associated with or in any way arising out of any such change made without 
written direction from Contractor. (R. 670-71; emphasis original.) 
4. In April 2004, before the subcontract was signed, Subcontractor determined 
that two design specified items (the Bryant boiler and the A.O Smith water heaters) were 
9 
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incompatible, would not function properly together, and would create a danger for human 
safety due to incompatible venting. (R. 673.) The Bryant boiler had a positive pressure 
flue and the water heaters had an atmospheric pressure flue and are not compatible. (Id.) 
5. At the time the subcontract was signed Subcontractor did not directly advise 
Contractor of the design incompatibility of the two systems and Subcontractor should 
have done such; that given the strong language of Tf 10 of the subcontract, that 
Subcontractor had an "absolute duty" to advise contractor in writing of a change in 
equipment or design deficiency; and that the burden was on Subcontractor to obtain 
approval for the boiler and venting system substitution "FROM CONTRACTOR," not 
from an engineer with whom Subcontractor had no contract. (R. 675; emphasis original.) 
The trial court determined Subcontractor materially breached the subcontract with 
Contractor by failing to provide written notice of the design deficiency when it became 
aware of the design deficiency in the project, and then later substituted equipment (a Rite 
boiler for a Bryant boiler and additional venting system modifications) without 
authorization from Contractor. (R. 675-76, 689.) The trial court determined this was "a 
most material breach" and that it was Subcontractor's responsibility to obtain 
Contractor's consent by advising Contractor in writing, and that this duty under the 
subcontract was not fulfilled by making an oral statement well before the subcontract was 
even signed. (R. 675-76, 689.) The trial court observed that "Even if [Subcontractor] is 
correct that at the time of advising [Contractor] there was no written contract, that duty 
arose when the contract was signed. If, as [Subcontractor] claims, the possible danger of 
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having an incompatible system was life threatening, the Court finds and concludes that 
the duty on [Subcontractor], negotiated for by [Contractor], is clear." (R. 676.) 
6. Subcontractor installed the Rite boiler and other venting components 
without notice to Contractor. (See R. 689.) The trial court concluded that the Rite boiler 
was not equivalent because it was not what Contractor wanted and its upkeep and 
maintenance and operation involved a system Contractor specifically did not want or 
contract for. (Id.) Subcontractor also failed to properly install a "mixer valve" which 
caused over heating in the units until that was remedied in February 2005. (Id.) 
7. On April 26, 2005, Contractor sent a letter to Subcontractor asking, among 
other things, that the non-specified defective equipment (boiler and changes to venting 
system) be replaced. (R. 787; Ex. D-22.) Contractor claimed the right under the 
subcontract to withhold payment until the specified equipment was installed. (See R. 
787; Ex. D-2; App. B-l.) Subcontractor did not act on Contractor's written demand. 
(See R. 783; Ex. D-19.) Subcontractor maintained throughout trial that it had the right to 
make "equivalent substitutions" of equipment, and that the Rite boiler and related 
changes to the venting systems were equivalent. Consequently, the non-specified boiler 
system was still in place at the time of the June 11, 2010 evidentiary hearing. (R. 899, 
pp. 100; R. 142-43; 903-04; 783.) 
8. The court found that Contractor was entitled to what it bargained for, the 
contracted-for specified system and not a system of the choosing of Subcontractor, and 
that because of the breach, Subcontractor was responsible for either the replacement of 
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the boiler and allied venting system or to pay Contractor the cost of having another 
subcontractor do such work and provide the correct equipment. (See R. 690.) 
9. The trial court specifically determined in Finding # 7 that *[  17 of the 
subcontract allowed Contractor to withhold payment to protect contractor from loss, 
including costs and attorney fees, on account of defective subcontractor work not 
remedied and for other reasons. (R. 672; Ex. D-2; App. B-l.) Paragraph 17 also 
provided that attorney fees could be sought if incurred enforcing the subcontract. (Id.) 
10. The trial court determined the true cost of the "fix" of Subcontractor's non-
conforming work was $80,000 and ordered the judgment to be reduced by the $80,000 
amount. (See R. 785.) Even thought the trial court determined that Subcontractor had 
materially breached the subcontract, the trial court made no finding as to Contractor's 
attorney fees incurred as damages in enforcing the subcontract. (See generally R. 665-
93; 781-89; 785-86.) 
Defective Installation of Mixing Valve - Overheating of Units 
11. Problems with Subcontractor's work began almost immediately after 
occupancy. (R. 681-82.) The luxury units, especially on the top floor, were very hot, as 
were the hallways. (Id) The project was heated by water circulating from the boiler 
through the units and halls, and then coil fans blew that radiant heated air into the units 
and halls. (R. 682.) With the venting system installed by Subcontractor, the heat of each 
unit was not controlled by a thermostat in each room. (Id.) The boiler installed was 
controlled by what is called a VFD, or variable frequency driver. (Id.) Under the lease, 
Premier's guests paid $1000-1500 per night and had temperatures of 80 or 90 degrees F 
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or above, and were told to open the windows by Premier agents. (Id.) Most of the guests 
asked for and many received refunds. (Id.) 
12. After the "over heating" problem became evident, all parties involved 
began examining the problem, and various solutions were proposed, none of which 
worked until sometime in February 2005. (Id.) The trial court found that the problem 
causing the overheating was the lack of installation of a "mixer valve" in the boiler water 
circulation system. (R. 783.) When the mixer valve was installed, the overheating 
problem ceased. Subcontractor did not do the work properly and did not install the mixer 
valve and the system did not work properly until mid February 2005. (See R. 683.) 
However even though the units continued to experience overheating problems through 
mid February 2005, the trial court found that the missed mixing valve did NOT delay the 
occupancy date by Owner and thus the damages resulting from that breach of contract to 
perform proper work are in issue. (R. 685.) 
Substantial Completion by September 20, 2004 
13. The subcontract provided that work was to be substantially completed by 
September 20, 2004. (R. 671.) Prior to trial, the court entered an order granting partial 
summary judgment in favor of the Owner and Contractor holding that the subcontract 
was unambiguous. (R. 676.) More specifically the court stated: "The court finds and 
concludes as above, that the [Subcontractor's] work was not completed timely and that 
[Subcontractor] has breached the contract on that issue. The court finds and concludes 
also that [Subcontractor] did not give written notice of [the design] deficiencies, that was 
a breach but the question of the materiality of that breach remains for trial." (R. 530-43.) 
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14. Following trial, the court modified its position about the subcontract being 
unambiguous. In finding 13 the court stated: 
The Court has already ruled on December 4, 2009, on motion for summary 
judgment, that the subcontract was unambiguous. That, after presentation of the 
facts at trial, was wrong at least in part. The Court determined it was not disputed 
that [Subcontractor] had not provided a written notice of a deficiency in the design 
as required by paragraph 10 and that such was a breach, and the Court now finds, 
as above, that factually and legally that is still correct. The Court reserved and 
found there was a factual issue about whether that breach was material, which is a 
question of law for the Court but the Court needed further factual development to 
make that determination. The Court also determined that there had not been 
substantial completion of the work by September 20, 2004, and that remains true 
and undisputed. The Court allowed evidence, and thus this trial, to allow evidence 
to be presented to determine if the failure to substantially compete the work under 
the contract affected the damage claims of the parties. The reasons for the delay 
were to be factually determined. (R. 676.) 
15. Contractor had a deadline of December 1, 2004 to turn the project over to 
Owner, which had a lease with Premier Resorts to allow Premier Resorts to lease the 
units for the holiday season, and thereafter. (R. 677.) The project was on a deadline and 
time was of the essence. (Id.) Under 12.2.5 of the prime contract, if the work was not 
done on time by Contractor, then Contractor was obligated to lend Owner each month an 
amount equal to the difference between what Owner would have received in promised 
fixed rentals (from Premier Resorts) and the actual net revenue that Owner did receive, 
not to exceed $400,000. (Id.) Owner was able to take possession was December 18, 
2004 rather than December 1,2004, approximately one half month late. (Id.) Owner 
asserted that because there was no transfer by the date required, December 1, 2004, it 
failed to receive the promised fixed rents but instead shared in the actual rents with 
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Premier, resulting in damages of over $678,000, the difference between what the fixed 
rent (base monthly rental) would have been, and the variable rate (on a 60-40 split in 
favor of Silver Baron over Premier) rents actually received. (R. 687.) 
16. Contractor claimed it paid the $400,000 liquidated damages required under 
the prime contract to Owner when Owner was dissolved. (R. 688.) Contractor was 
unable to make the $400,000 loan required by the prime contract and nothing happened 
until Owner was dissolved, then Owner was credited the sum of $400,000. (Id.) 
17. During the work by Subcontractor several changes were requested but only 
three signed change orders exist. (R. 679.) In none of them did Subcontractor request an 
extension of time to complete the work, though the change order forms allowed a space 
for such a request to be made. (Id.) 
18. Notwithstanding the subcontract substantial completion deadline date of 
September 20, 2004 (and that no extension had been granted by any change order) 
Subcontractor first ordered a boiler—the non specified Rite boiler—on September 1, 
2004. (R. 675.) The trial court found that the construction of the building was delayed 
overall by various factors, some of which were not of Subcontractor's making or caused 
by Subcontractor. (R. 679.) 
19. The court found from an examination of the work records and the testimony 
that Subcontractor had a crew of varying sizes but that the work did not get done quickly 
enough to comply with the September 20, 2004 date. (Id.) However, the court found a 
legal ambiguity in the subcontract itself—with the September 20, 2004 substantial 
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completion date—but in at least two other places fl[ 9 and Exhibit B) that date was meant 
to have some flexibility in it. The trial court stated that it: 
[...] cannot find that date was intended to be a fixed immovable date and it was 
not. There were delays "built into" the contract which as noted in a [work] 
schedule given by [Contractor] to [Subcontractor] called for the final mechanical 
work to be done by November 11, 2004. The entire course of conduct between 
these parties and their practice shows flexibility up to a certain point, as there must 
be, depending on many circumstances in a project such as this. While the 
minutiae of the times need not be detailed, obviously there were other trades that 
were part of the delay, as well as [Contactor] itself. For example, it is undisputed 
that on November 23, 2004, [Subcontractor] notified [Contractor] that 
[Subcontractor] could not finish because various counter tops, cabinets, paint and 
tile were not completed in various named units and so the finish plumbing could 
not be finished in those 12 units detailed. While the evidence is not strong as to 
why that was so, November 23, 2004, is well after the claimed September 20 
substantial completion date and yet other trades were still not completed with their 
work so that [Subcontractor] could complete its work. The Court is aware that 
such delay occasioned by lack of cabinets or counter tops perhaps was only a 
minor delay because [Subcontractor] had at that point probably only to install 
finish faucets and handles and such after counter tops are installed, a short task for 
a crew of 4-8 people. Further, though it is disputed as to its effect, there seems 
little dispute that in fact a main water line was not available until November 17, 
2004. That is the responsibility of [Contractor]. Even though there was another 
water line available for some purposes, the main line was not available until then 
and that was not [Subcontractor's responsibility. Even though there is a non-
waiver provision, clearly in early December 2004 [Contractor] stated that 
[Contractor] needed the plumbing done by December 8 and called for 
increased manpower from [Subcontractor]. The Court generally finds in 
favor of [Contractor] on that issue, that [Contractor] asked for increased 
manpower and [Subcontractor] did not provide it However, overall the Court 
cannot join [Contractor] in putting the blame for the failure to turn over the project 
on December 1, 2004 to [Owner] all on [Subcontractor]. Clearly some delay was 
caused by [Subcontractor] but there was some delay of an unknown duration in the 
overall project because of a structural steel issue about design and cost in 
Quadrant 3 of Building F. While some trades, perhaps even [Subcontractor], 
perhaps were not unduly delayed, the Court finds that the overall project was 
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delayed as much as 60 days from some of those issues apart from [Subcontractor], 
and that cannot all be upon [Subcontractor]. (R. 679-81, emphasis added.) 
20. Even though Subcontractor did not install the heating system "mixing 
valve" until mid February 2005, and continued to do certain repair and finish work into 
March 2005, the trial court found that Subcontractor had substantially completed its work 
under the Subcontract on December 18, 2004. (Id.) A temporary certificate of 
occupancy was issued by Park City December on 22 or 23, 2004, allowing occupancy of 
the units. (R. 681.) This finding implies that the trial court made a legal conclusion that 
"substantial completion" and "occupancy" are synonymous, even though the court found 
that heating system was not functioning properly until mid February 2005, after the 
missed mixing valve was installed. 
Judgment, Costs and Attorney Fees 
21. Following the June 11, 2010 evidentiary hearing, the trial court made 
additional findings and conclusions. The trial court found that: 
A. Contractor breached the subcontract by failing to pay Subcontractor 
$209,915.00. (R. 784.) However, because Subcontractor did not install the system 
Contractor had contracted for, the trial court ordered Subcontractor to install the proper 
"fix" and correct the system by re-installing the proper (contract-specified) boiler and 
new flue system. (R. 784-85.) 
B. Subcontractor breached the subcontract by failing to provide written notice 
of its knowledge that there was a design deficiency and of Subcontractor's intent to 
substitute non-specified equipment without notifying or obtaining the consent of 
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contractor. (Id.) In addition the trial court concluded that even though this breach was 
material and had occurred upon the signing of the subcontract that: 
[ ] However, even considering the first breach rule, the court finds that the 
breach by [Subcontractor] was not one that resulted in [Contractor]' right to fail to 
pay. Even though the contract has many provisions allowing [Contractor] to 
withhold payment for various reasons, the promise of [Subcontractor] to give 
written notice is not a dependent or reciprocal obligation tied to payment. The 
court has found that notice was given by [Subcontractor], but not written notice. 
[Contractor] in letters asked [Subcontractor] to change the system and 
[Subcontractor] did not do so, but this order of the court, reducing the damages for 
non-payment by the amount of the re-installation of the "new" system amounts to 
the only damages suffered by [Contractor]. (R. 785-86.) 
Even though the trial court had previously found, as Finding 7, that f^ 17 of the 
Subcontract allowed "Contractor to withhold payment to protect contractor from loss, 
including costs and attorney fees, on account of defective subcontractor work not 
remedied and for other reasons" (R. 672), the trial court made no findings as to 
Contractor's attorney fees and collection costs incurred as damages in enforcing the 
subcontract due to Subcontractor's breach. (See generally R. 665-93; 781-89; see also R. 
786.) The declaration made by counsel for Owner and Contractor apportioned 
approximate legal fees to the various claims. (R. 720-727.) 
C. The trial court over the objection of Owner and Contractor allowed pre-
judgment interest. (See R. 787.) Even though it required a post trial evidentiary hearing 
to determine the amount of the "proper fix" to remedy Subcontractor's deficient and non-
conforming work, the trial court found the Subcontractor's damages to be "certain, minus 
the reinstallation work" and allowed prejudgment interest on the entire gross sum due 
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Subcontractor ($209,915), not the net amount of the judgment ($209,915 minus $80,000). 
(See id.) 
D. As a conclusion of law, the trial court awarded Subcontractor $129,915 
($209,915 minus the installation costs of $80,000) against Owner and Contractor, jointly 
and severally; pre-judgment interest on the entire $209,915; and, against Owner, costs in 
an amount of $4,400 and attorney fees of $45,000. (Id.) With respect to Contractor, 
Subcontractor was awarded its judgment under the subcontract. (See R. 784-87.) With 
respect to Owner, Subcontractor was awarded its judgment under Utah Code Ann. §14-
2-2. (See id.) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The plain terms of the subcontract allow Contractor to withhold payment from 
Subcontractor due to Subcontractor's deficient and non-conforming work. The court 
found Subcontractor in material breach of the subcontract. The court also found that 
remedying Subcontractor's work under the agreement would cost $80,000, which was 
offset from the amounts the court awarded to Subcontractor for payment. However, at 
least eight separate provisions under the subcontract and warranty expressly allow 
Contractor to withhold the amounts the trial court awarded as judgment to Subcontractor. 
This includes paragraph 17 of the subcontract, which provides for attorney fees and 
collection costs to be withheld as damages, which counsel for Contractor and Owner 
apportioned at approximately $60,000. 
As Contractor was entitled to withhold payment from Subcontractor as discussed 
above, any award of prejudgment interest to Subcontractor is improper; to make such an 
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award ignores the plain terms of the agreement. Prejudgment interest may only be 
awarded when a loss can be fixed as of a definite time and calculated with certainty. Due 
to Subcontractor's deficient and non-conforming work, the loss to Subcontractor was 
undeterminable until the court found that it would cost $809000 to remediate the work. 
At trial, the court allowed what amounted to expert testimony from three of 
Subcontractor's witnesses. At an earlier pretrial, the trial court refused to reopen 
discovery so that both Contractor and Subcontractor could designate expert witnesses. At 
no point prior to trial were any expert witnesses designated by any party as required 
under Utah R. Civ. P. 26(a)(3)(A). Although the testimony of the witnesses in question 
went far beyond the typical juror's knowledge or common experience, the trial court 
erroneously admitted the testimony as that of lay witnesses. Without any designation or 
notice as required, the expert testimony of the witnesses should have been excluded. The 
opinion of Subcontractor's expert witnesses significantly affected the trial court's 
decision. As Contractor and Owner were subjected to undue prejudice and surprise, a 
new trial should have been granted pursuant to Rule 59. 
ARGUMENT 
I. Contractor Was Entitled under the Subcontract to Withhold Payment from 
Subcontractor to Enforce the Subcontract. 
"The district court's construction of contract language is given no particular 
weight and is reviewed for correctness as a matter of law." Doctors' Co. v. Drezga, 2009 
UT 60,19, 218 P.3d 598 (citing LDSHosp. v. Capitol Life Ins. Co., 765 P.2d 857, 858 
(Utah 1988)). 
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The trial court ruled that Contractor owes Subcontractor $256,786 (minus 
$126,871 in offsets) for payment under the subcontract. See R. 798-801, 689-92; see 
generally R. 781-89. The subcontract, however, expressly allows Contractor to withhold 
this amount from Subcontractor based upon Subcontractor's defective and non-
conforming work. Subcontractor's breaches of the subcontract are documented in the 
trial court's Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law, which were specifically 
incorporated into the final judgment and order. See generally R. 665-93; R. 691. 
1. Contractor Was Entitled under the Subcontract to Withhold Payment from 
Subcontractor Amounting to at Least $256,786 Including Collection Costs 
and A ttorney Fees for Enforcing the Subcontract. 
"In evaluating the contract, [the appellate] court must first ascertain whether the 
contract was integrated and second whether it was ambiguous. Bailey-Allen Co. v. 
Kurzet, 876 P.2d 421, 424 (Utah Ct. App. 1994)(citing Ron Case Roofing & Asphalt 
Paving, Inc. v. Blomquist, 113 P.2d 1382, 1385 (Utah 1989)); see also Tangren Family 
Trust v. Tangren, 2008 UT 20, 182 P.3d 326 (analyzing integration and ambiguity in 
contract interpretation). 
The trial court found that the subcontract was integrated. R. 536; see also Ex. D-
2, § 29; App. B-1. The trial court found no ambiguity in the subcontract, except that the 
substantial completion date "had some flexibility in it." R. 673-74, 676, 679; see also R. 
536. Contractor is not challenging the substantial completion date for purposes of this 
appeal. 
While the trial court found that Subcontractor had breached the subcontract, and 
that at least one of these breaches was "a most material breach" (R. 689-90; see also R. 
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668, 676, 685, 538-41, 785), the court misinterpreted the subcontract by failing to 
recognize Contractor's bargained-for right to withhold payments from Subcontractor for < 
the defective and non-conforming work comprising the breach(es). 
The subcontract between Contractor and Subcontractor provides in relevant 
(though lengthy) portion: 
[ • •J 
3. REVIEW OF CONTRACT DOCUMENTS AND PROJECT SITE: 1 
Subcontractor acknowledges that prior to its execution of this Subcontract 
Agreement: (i) it has reviewed and examined all of the construction plans, 
drawings, models, specifications, measurements, schedules and addenda for the 
Project that it deems relevant to the performance of the Subcontract Work [....] i 
[ • • • ] 
4. PROGRESS PAYMENTS: Contractor shall pay Subcontractor the Subcontract 
Price and other amounts that may come due to the Subcontractor under this 4 
Subcontract on a percentage of completion basis, as determined by Contractor [... 
.] As long as Subcontractor is in compliance with this Subcontract, Contractor 
shall pay Subcontractor each progress payment within ten working days after 
receipt by Contractor of Contractor's payment from Owner. 
i 
Contractor may withhold monthly progress payments, in whole or in part, in order 
to protect Contractor and/or Owner from loss from: 
4.1 Defective work not remedied, material not furnished, clean-up not 
performed or any other non-complying aspects of the Subcontract Work; < 
4.5 Unsatisfactory prosecution of the Subcontract Work by Subcontractor; 
[...] 
4.10 Any other conditions of any nature which may arise from 
Subcontractors action or failure to act which, in Contractor's reasonable opinion, 
will result in loss to Owner and/or Contractor. 
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When the grounds set forth in subparagraphs 4.1 through 4.10 are removed by 
Subcontractor to the satisfaction of Contractor, payment of the amounts so 
withheld will be made by Contractor pursuant to the procedures set forth in 
paragraph 4 above. 
[. . .] 
5. FINAL PAYMENT: The balance of the Subcontract Price and any other 
amounts owed to Subcontractor under the terms of this Subcontract shall be due 
and payable when all of the following have occurred: (a) completion and 
acceptance of the Work by Owner; [...] (c) removal of any grounds for 
withholding payments under paragraph 4 above; [....] 
6. INVOICE PROCESSING: [...] In order for any application for payment to be 
"properly prepared/5 all of the following must be true with respect to each 
application for payment: 
6.1 The Subcontract Work billed is complete in the opinion of Contractor at 
the time of receipt of the application; 
[...] 
10. SUBCONTRACT CHANGE ORDERS: In the event Subcontractor finds any 
design deficiency, error in measurements, or errors in the Contract Documents or 
conditions which Subcontractor believes to be at variance with approved plans, 
Subcontractor shall have an absolute duty to immediately provide written notice 
thereof to Contractor. [. ..] If any changes cause a material increase or decrease 
in the amount of work, Subcontractor agrees to accept any such changes subject to 
this paragraph and to proceed without delay to perform the Subcontract Work as 
changed. Prior to the commencement of any such material changes in the 
Subcontract Work, Subcontractor shall submit a written claim for any required 
adjustment to the Contract Amount with a breakdown, supporting invoices and/or 
quotes. [.. .] If Subcontractor makes such change or any other changes to the 
Subcontract Work without written direction from Contractor, such change 
constitutes an agreement by Subcontractor that it will not be paid for that changed 
work and Subcontractor shall be liable for any and all losses, costs, expenses, 
damages, and liability of any nature whatsoever associated with or in any way 
arising out of any such change made without written direction from Contractor. 
[...] 
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11. MATERIALS, INSPECTION, TESTING AND CLEAN-UP: [...] Contractor 
shall have the right to reject improper or defective material or workmanship or 
require correction without charge to Contractor. { 
[...] 
13. WARRANTY: [...] The obligations of the Subcontractor under 
subparagraphs 13.1 through 13.45 shall include the correction of the defective or { 
non-conforming Subcontract Work that appears within one year following the 
completion and acceptance of the Subcontract Work [....] 
The obligations of the Subcontractor under subparagraphs 13.1 through 13.4 shall 
include the correction of the defective or non-conforming Subcontract Work, the 
removal and replacement of other portions of the Work that are necessary to be 
removed to gain access to the Subcontract Work to be corrected, the repair or 
replacement of any damage caused by said defective or non-conforming 
Subcontract Work, and all consequential damages suffered by Contractor or
 { 
Owner as a result of said defective or non-conforming Subcontract Work or the 
failure of Subcontractor to promptly and properly correct same. [...] 
[...] 
i 
17. WITHHOLDING PAYMENT. Contractor may withhold all or part of any 
payment to the extent necessary to protect Contractor from loss, including costs 
and attorney's fees, on account of (i) defective Subcontract Work not remedied; [. 
..] or (vii) any other ground for withholding payment allowed by law or as 
otherwise provided in this Subcontract Agreement including but not limited to < 
attorney's fees incurred by Contractor to enforce this Subcontract or remedy 
Subcontractor's default. When the above matters are rectified, such amounts as 
then due and owing shall be paid or credited to Subcontractor. 
26. WAIVER: The provisions of this Subcontract Agreement requiring written 
notice may not be waived by oral agreement, act, or failure to act or object, by 
Contractor. No restriction, condition, obligation or provision of this Subcontract 
Agreement shall be deemed to have been abrogated, or waived, by reason of any 
failure or failures to enforce by Contractor. Subcontractor hereby acknowledges 
and agrees that no individual employee of Contractor has the authority either 
5
 See Ex. D-2 and Add. B-1 for a copy of the subcontract. The entire agreement has not \ 
been quoted above, but can be found in Add. B-1. 
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express, implied or apparent, to waive the notice provisions set forth in this 
Agreement with respect to the making of claims for additional compensation, time 
extensions, or otherwise. Any such written notice must be delivered in the time 
required by this Agreement and cannot be waived except by a written waiver 
executed by an individual authorized by the President of Contractor. 
[...] 
29. ENTIRE AGREEMENT: This Subcontract Agreement constitutes the entire 
agreement of the parties, and may not be modified or amended except in writing. 
Parol evidence shall not be admitted in interpretation of the provisions of this 
Subcontract Agreement. 
Ex.D-2;App.B-l. 
The "Warranty/Guarantee" provided by Subcontractor to Contractor states in relevant 
part: 
[Subcontractor] do[es] hereby warranty and guarantee that the parts of the work 
described above which we have furnished and/or installed for: 
The Lodges at Deer Valley, Park City, UT 
Is in accordance with the contract documents and that all said work as installed 
will fulfill or exceed all of the warranty and guarantee requirements. 
[Subcontractor] agree[s] to repair or replace work installed by [Subcontractor], 
together with any adjacent work which is displaced or damaged by so doing, that 
proves to be defective in workmanship, material or operation within a period of 
one (1) year from the date of final acceptance of the entire work by Owner, 
ordinary wear and tear and unusual neglect or abuse expected. 
In the event of [Subcontractor's] failure to comply with the above mentioned 
conditions within a reasonable time period determined by the Owner, after 
notification in writing, we, the undersigned, all collectively and separately hereby 
authorize the Owner to have said defective work repaired and/or replaced and 
made good and agree to pay the Owner upon demand all monies that were 
expended in making good said defective work, including all collection costs and 
reasonable attorney fees. 
Ex. D-7; App. B-2. 
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I 
Under the above quoted subcontract and warranty provisions, Contractor is 
entitled to withhold payment from Subcontractor for certain stated conditions related to i 
Subcontractor's defective and non-conforming work. Exs. D-2, D-7; Apps. B-2, B-2. 
Specifically, Contractor is allowed to withhold payment under Sections 4, 5, 6, 10, 11, 
13,17, and the warranty. Id. (These contract sections will be discussed in more detail 
below.) 
The trial court found that Subcontractor had breached the agreement by failing to 
provide written notice of a design defect and intent to substitute equipment (R. 675-76, 
689)(concluding that such breach was "a most material breach"), that the boilers and { 
related venting system substituted by Subcontractor were installed without notice to 
Contractor, were not equivalent and involved a system that Contractor did not want (R. 
i 
685, 689), that Subcontractor's failure to properly install a mixer valve caused serious 
overheating problems of the building even months after "substantial completion" (R. 682-
85, 689)(concluding that Subcontractor "did not do the work properly and did not install * 
6
 The Subcontract also contains a provision under Section 15 for declaring the 
Subcontract "null and void" and for exercising additional remedies. Ex. D-2, § 15; App. < 
B-l. Although Contractor never exercised (and candidly admitted so in trial) the 
remedies under Section 15, it maintained all of the contractual payment withholding 
rights as Section 15 states that the Contractor, "without any prejudice to any rights or 
remedies," shall have the right, in its sole discretion, to exercise the remedies in Section
 i 
15. Id. 
Interestingly, the trial court also briefly addresses Contractor's right to withhold 
payments under Section 17 of the subcontract to remedy defective work, but does not 
return to its analysis of this section except briefly to note that Subcontractor is not 1 
entitled to attorney fees under the same provision. R. 672, 690. 
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that mixer valve properly [ ] until mid February 2005"), and that Subcontractor was 
responsible for either replacement of the substituted boiler and allied venting system or 
the cost of having another subcontractor provide such work and equipment (R. 690). The 
cost to remedy Subcontractor's work was later determined to be $80,000, not including 
attorney fees and collection costs to enforce correction of the breach. See generally R. 
781-89. The actions of, and defective work performed by, Subcontractor directly 
violated the subcontract. 
On February 22, 2005 and April 26, 2005, Mr. Alan Wright, on behalf of 
Contractor, sent written notifications to Subcontractor that the equipment was not 
installed as originally designed and contracted for, leading to serious overheating 
problems, including problems with the boiler, and formally requested Subcontractor 
replace the defective equipment or litigation would be necessary. Exs. D-18, D-22; see 
also R. 687. Subcontractor responded by stating that, with one exception unrelated to 
this appeal, "[Subcontractor] has completed all contractual obligations as of the end of 
the workday February 18, 2005." Ex. D-19. This necessitated the current litigation, 
which was the only available remedy to the "most material" breach of Subcontractor after 
Subcontractor refused to correct. 
The trial court specifically found that Subcontractor's material breach led to 
offsets of $80,000 as a "fix" required to remedy Subcontractor's work. R. 785. The trial 
court, despite the significant cost of the remedial "fix," found that Subcontractor "did the 
work and has not been paid," resulting in an award of $256,786 (minus $126,871 in 
offsets) for Subcontractor. 
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Given the trial court's determination of Subcontractor's material breach, the award 
for Subcontractor misinterprets the payment withholding provisions of the subcontract. 
Specifically, among other rights, the subcontract allows Contractor to: 
• Withhold monthly progress payments resulting from Subcontractor's 
defective work not remedied and other non-complying subcontract work 
until such time as the work complies with the subcontract (Ex. D-2, § 4; 
App.B-1) 
1 
• Withhold final payment and any other amounts owed to Subcontractor until 
completion of Subcontractor's work and acceptance by owner, and until 
Subcontractor's defective work is remedied and other non-complying 
subcontract work complies with the subcontract (Ex. D-2, § 5; App. B-l) 
i 
• Charge Subcontractor for all losses, costs, expenses, and damages arising 
from Subcontractor's changes made without written direction from 
Contractor (Ex. D-2, § 6; App. B-l) 
• Withhold any payment to Subcontractor arising from Subcontractor's < 
changes made without written direction from Contractor (Ex. D-2, § 6; 
App.B-1) 
• Require Subcontractor to remove or replace all defective or non-
conforming subcontract work, and charge Subcontractor for any 
consequential damages resulting from all defective or non-conforming 
subcontract work, including Subcontractor's failure to promptly and 
properly correct the same (Ex. D-2, § 13; App. B-l) 
• Withhold all or part of any payment to protect Contractor from loss, 
including costs and attorney fees, on account of Subcontractor's defective 
subcontract work not remedied, and to withhold payment, including 
amounts to cover Contractor's attorney fees, incurred to enforce the 
subcontract. Only when these subcontract matters are rectified is Contractor ^ 
required to pay or credit Subcontractor. (Ex. D-2, § 17; App. B-l) 
• Require Subcontractor to pay Owner all monies, including collection costs 
and attorney fees, expended in making good Subcontractor's defective 
work (Ex. D-7; App. B-2) 1 
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"Under well-accepted rules of contract interpretation, [the appellate courts] look to 
the language of the contract to determine its meaning and the intent of the contracting 
parties ... [w]here the language within the four corners of the contract is unambiguous, 
the parties' intentions are determined from the plain meaning of the contractual language, 
and the contract may be interpreted as a matter of law." Stone v. Flint, 2010 UT App 
199, Tf 1, 238 P.3d 70 (quoting Cafe Rio, Inc. v. Larkin-Gifford-Overton, LLC, 2009 UT 
27, If 25, 207 P.3d 1235). The above subcontract provisions are unambiguous, and the 
plain meaning expressly allows Contractor to withhold payment until Subcontractor's 
work is remedied, and to withhold amounts for the collection costs and attorney fees 
required to enforce the agreement. See Exs. D-2, §§ 4-6, 13, 17; D-7; Apps. B-l, B-2. 
Importantly, as the trial court found, Contractor did not contest, in terms of "pure 
math," the amount claimed by Subcontractor. R. 686. Rather, Contractor and Owner 
contested that this amount was due and owing since Subcontractor had materially 
breached the contract and "did not do the work properly" (R. 685, 689), refused to 
replace its defective and non-conforming work (see Ex. D-19), and because litigation was 
necessary to bring Subcontractor's work into compliance with the agreement. In the 
course of litigation, through its current counsel, contractor apportioned approximately 
$60,000 towards enforcing the contract. See R. 725. 
While the trial court found that Subcontractor "did the work and has not been 
paid" (R. 689), it also found that Subcontractor materially breached the contract by 
failing to provide written notice of design defect and intent to substitute equipment (id), 
that the boilers were not equivalent and involved a system that Contractor and Owner did 
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not want (id), that the failure to properly install a mixer valve caused overheating of the 
building (R. 682-85; 689), and that Subcontractor was responsible for either replacement { 
of the boiler and allied venting system or the cost of having another subcontractor 
provide such work and equipment (R. 690), which cost was later determined to be 
$80,000 (see generally R. 781-89). 
As shown above, these are the breaches and non-conforming work of 
Subcontractor for which Contractor was specifically entitled to withhold payments, 
including all anticipated collection costs and attorney fees, under the Subcontract. See 
Exs. D-2, §§ 4-6, 13, 17; D-7; Apps. B-1, B-2. The amount awarded to Subcontractor by ^ 
the trial court for having "d[one] the work]" was only due and owing under the 
subcontract upon conclusion of the litigation, and only after taking into account the 
amounts Contractor was entitled to withhold for collection costs and attorney fees in 
litigation since litigation was required to bring Subcontractor's work into compliance 
with the specifications of the subcontract. See Exs. D-18, D-19, D-22. ( 
The trial court erred by not recognizing Contractor's bargained-for right to 
withhold payments from Subcontractor for the defective and non-conforming work 
K 
7
 Because the trial court concluded as a matter of law that the breach did not allow 
Contractor to withhold payment (see generally R. 689-91), the court did not address the 
allocated portion of attorney fees (approximately $60,000 (see R. 725)) that Contractor 
claimed toward enforcing the subcontract. Contractor enforced the contract, as evidenced 
by Subcontractor being ordered to either "replace[ ] the boiler and allied venting system 
or to pay [Contractor] the cost of having another subcontractor do such work and provide 
such equipment." See R. 690. 
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performed by Subcontractor. Contractor was entitled to withhold at least $256,786 under 
the agreement until the work was remedied and the subcontract enforced. Contractor 
respectfully requests that this issue be remanded to the trial court for determination as to 
the exact amount Contractor was entitled to withhold, including for collection costs and 
attorney fees (including for the appeal) pursuant to the subcontract. Contractor is seeking 
recovery of attorney fees incurred on appeal under the subcontract. 
2. At a Minimum, Contractor Was Entitled under the Subcontract to Withhold 
Payment from Subcontractor Amounting to at Least $80,000 Plus 
Collection Costs and Attorney Fees for Enforcing the Subcontract. 
The trial court recognized that the "fix" required by Subcontractor's defective and 
non-conforming work amounted to approximately $80,000, and that such amount would 
be properly deducted from the judgment to Subcontractor. See generally R. 781-89. 
While finding that the amount of $80,000 was required to remedy Subcontractor's 
work, the trial court misinterpreted the subcontract by not recognizing that Contractor 
was entitled to withhold the $80,000 and to include amounts for attorney fees and costs 
pursuant to the agreement. See Exs. D-2, §§ 4-6, 13, 17; D-7; Apps. B-l, B-2. 
Contractor gave notice to Subcontractor that the work was not installed as 
designed, and requested that the defective equipment be replaced. Exs. D-18, D-22; see 
also R. 687. Subcontractor refused to bring its work into conformance with the 
subcontract. See D-19. This necessitated the current litigation, which was the only 
o 
The trial court stated that Subcontractor "is responsible for either the replacement of the 
boiler and allied venting system or to pay [Contractor] the cost of having another 
subcontractor do such work and provide such equipment." R. 690. 
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available remedy to Subcontractor's "most material" breach and led to the "fix" of other 
work that Subcontractor did not do correctly. See R. 689, 785. Without judicial i 
involvement, Subcontractor would not have replaced the boiler or met its contractual 
obligations. Under the subcontract, then, Contractor was specifically entitled to withhold 
at least $80,000 plus collection costs and attorney fees for enforcing the agreement. 
The trial court erred by not recognizing that Contractor, in prevailing on its 
$80,000 offset against Subcontractor, had correctly withheld such amounts under the 
agreement, and that litigation to enforce such provisions was necessary to receive the 
benefit of its bargain with Subcontractor. Accordingly, under the subcontract, Contractor
 i 
was entitled to withhold the $80,000 plus its attorney fees and collection costs for 
enforcing the agreement. 
Contractor was entitled to withhold at least $80,000 and collection costs and 
attorney fees under the agreement. Contractor respectfully requests that this issue be 
remanded to the trial court for determination as to the exact amount Contractor was < 
entitled to withhold, including for collection costs and attorney fees (including for the 
appeal) pursuant to the subcontract. Contractor is seeking recovery of attorney fees 
incurred on appeal under the subcontract. 
II. As Contractor Was Entitled to Withhold Payment from Subcontractor, 
Subcontractor Is Not Entitled to Prejudgment Interest. 
"The trial court's award of prejudgment interest, and the amount thereof, present 
[ ] a question of law which we review for correctness." Kealamakia, Inc. v. Kealamakia, 
2009 UT App 148, U 4, 213 P.3d 13 (alteration in original)(internal citations and 
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quotations omitted). Also, the "trial court's decisions on plaintiffs entitlement to 
prejudgment interest presents a question of law which we review for correctness." 
Andreason v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 848 P.2d 171, 177 (Utah App. 1993). 
1. As Contractor Was Entitled under the Subcontract to Withhold Payment 
from Subcontractor, Prejudgment Interest is Improper. 
The subcontract between Contractor and Subcontractor allows Contractor to 
withhold payment for deficient or non-conforming work under at least eight different 
sections of the contract. Exs. D-2, §§ 4, 5, 65 10, 11, 13, 17; D-7; Adds. B-l, B-2; see 
also Section I, supra. Contractor did not dispute the amount of payment claimed by 
Subcontractor, but instead disputed whether such amount was due and owing, and 
whether Subcontractor should be paid at all until it remedied its deficient and non-
conforming work. See R. 686. After the trial, the court found that "[Subcontractor] did 
the work and has not been paid." R. 689. After the supplemental evidentiary hearing the 
trial court stated, however, that "[i]t is not the system desired and bargained for [by 
Contractor] [....]" R- 787-88. The trial court made findings that Subcontractor 
materially breached the contract by failing to provide written notice of design defects and 
intent to substitute equipment (R. 689), that the boilers were not equivalent and involved 
a system the Contractor did not want {id.), that the failure to properly install a mixer 
valve caused overheating of the building {id.), and that Subcontractor is responsible for 
either the replacement of the boiler and allied venting system or the cost of having 
another subcontractor provide such work and equipment (R. 690). Given these breaches 
and deficient work by Subcontractor and the express terms of the subcontract, Contractor 
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was entitled to withhold payments under the Subcontract and any award of prejudgment 
interest against Contractor is improper. < 
2. Prejudgment Interest Was Improper until a Definite Sum Could Be Fixed. 
Prejudgment interest is properly awarded when a "loss ha[s]been fixed as of a 
definite time and the amount of the loss can be calculated with mathematical accuracy in 
accordance with the well-established rules of damages." Bailey-Allen Co., Inc. v. Kurzet, 
876 P.2d 421, 427 (Utah Ct. App. 1994)(quoting Bellon v. Malnar, 808 P.2d 1089, 1097 ' 
(Utah 1991))(internal quotations omitted). "On the other hand, where damages are 
incomplete or cannot be calculated with mathematical accuracy [...] the amount of the , 
damage must be ascertained and assessed by the trier of the fact at the trial, and in such 
cases prejudgment interest is not allowed." Bjork v. April Indus., Inc., 560 P.2d 315, 317 
(Utah 1977). 
In its Memorandum Decision dated January 29, 2010, the court held that 
"[Contractor] is entitled to what it bargained for, a system of its choosing and not the < 
choosing of [Subcontractor]. [Subcontractor] is responsible for either the replacement of 
the boiler and allied venting system or to pay [Contractor] the cost of having another 
i 
subcontractor do such work and provide such equipment." R. 690. The trial court made 
no findings as to how much such work should or would cost since the final amount due to 
Subcontractor was simply not determinable at that time. Later, after the supplemental 
evidentiary hearing, the trial court held and ordered that: 
[Subcontractor] is to install the proper fix and remediate the system [....] The 
court finds and concludes that in fact that can be done for an amount less than 
[Contractor] claims but more than [Subcontractor] claims. The court is somewhat 
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unguided here [....] Thus, the court will find and conclude, as best it can, that the 
true cost of this fix is $80,000.00 [....] 
R. 785 (internal quotations omitted). The trial court then went on to order the amount 
due Subcontractor reduced by $80,000.00. Id. Until this finding was made, the amount 
due Subcontractor was unknown and the loss as of a specific date not capable of being 
calculated with any mathematical certainty. 
As Subcontractor installed a system that was defective and never requested by 
Contractor, and as Subcontractor provided only incomplete and deficient work at best, 
prejudgment interest should not be based on the $209,915.00 calculation. Allowing the 
amount of judgment to be reduced by $80,000.00 only after prejudgment interest has 
been added to the $209,915.00 amount does not take into consideration that Contractor 
was saddled with a system that it did not want and for which it did not bargain. Rather, 
the $80,000.00 cost of the "fix," as determined by the trial court, along with the $60,000 
in attorney fees apportioned by Contractor, should have been counted against the value of 
the defective work provided by Subcontractor, and prejudgment interest should not have 
been awarded. 
While it may be true that Subcontractor "did not have use of this sum owed" (R. 
787), at least some part of this sum relates to a system that was defective and for work 
that was deficient. The appropriate cost of a "fix" of the defective system and services 
provided by Subcontractor was only determined by the trial court after the supplemental 
hearing. If damages to Subcontractor could be computed with mathematical accuracy at 
all, it could, at best, only be determined once the cost of a "fix" was also determined. In 
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this particular case, that would be starting on June 18, 2010, and not April 2005. As 
such, prejudgment interest is inappropriate in this case, and should be disallowed. 
3. At a Minimum, as Contractor was Entitled to Withhold at Least $80,000 
from Subcontractor, Prejudgment Interest Should Be Awarded on No More 
Than $129,915 of the Judgment. 
When a "breach consists of a failure to pay a definite sum in money or to render a 
performance with fixed or ascertainable monetary value, interest is recoverable from the 
time for performance on the amount due less all deductions to which the party in breach 
is entitled." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 354(1) (2011). If the Court finds 
and concludes that prejudgment interest for Subcontractor is appropriate, any such award 
should be calculated with the deduction to which Contractor is entitled, $80,000.00, 
withheld from the $209,915.00 sum. At most, any award of prejudgment interest should 
be calculated on the sum of $129,915.00 ($209,915.00 minus $80,00.00), less the 
collection costs and attorney fees Contractor was entitled to withhold for enforcing the 
contract. See Section I, supra. 
III. As Expert Witnesses Were Not Identified or Designated Pursuant to Utah R. 
Civ. P. 26(a)(3)(A), It Was Error for the Trial Court to Admit Expert Testimony. 
Appellants Were Entitled to a New Trial Under Utah R. Civ. P. 59. 
On July 21, 2009 the trial court conducted a pretrial conference. See R. 401-03, 
904. Because the case was a complex construction dispute, counsel for Contractor and 
Owner anticipated the need for expert testimony, and requested that the court open 
discovery as neither side had designated any expert witnesses. See R. 383-86, 401-03; 
see generally R. 904. Subcontractor's counsel objected and acknowledged that neither 
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side had designated any expert witnesses. R. 904, pp. 6-14. Under Utah R. Civ. P. 
26(a)(3)(A), disclosure of a party's expert witness is mandatory: "A party shall disclose 
to other parties the identity of any person who may be used at trial to present evidence 
under Rules 702, 703, or 705 of the Utah Rules of Evidence." 
During the examination of Subcontractor's second witness, Bill Payne, counsel for 
Owner and Contractor objected to the witness providing what amounted to expert opinion 
testimony on matters that were beyond the realm of common experience: 
MR. MARTIN: 
Q. And a Bryant boiler was specified originally? 
A. Correct. 
Q. With pressurized fluing? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Why couldn't it be used? 
A. The design 
MR. CHAMBERS: I'm going to object, foundation. Let me make sure the Court 
understands. In order for him to testify as to this, because it's beyond the scope 
and knowledge of the average person and involves technical or specialized 
knowledge, it would be treated as expert testimony and he's not laid the 
foundation for the expert testimony. If he attempted to lay the foundation for the 
expert testimony, it would violate this Court's rulings that discovery experts would 
9
 Mr. Chambers (Owner's and Contractor's counsel): I don't think either side has 
designated an expert witness on the case. R. 904, p. 8. Mr. Martin (Subcontractor's 
counsel): We're way passed, your honor, and neither side has designated an expert. R. 
904, p. 9. Mr. Chambers: What is the Court inclined to do about experts? R. 904, p. 13. 
The Court: (addressing Mr. Martin) You probably didn't do it because you don't see a 
need for one. Mr. Martin: There's no need, Your Honor. R. 904, p. 13. 
The Minutes of the Scheduling Conference also contains the following: "Discovery will 
not be opened for expert witnesses." R. 401. 
10
 This dialogue begins at R. 899, p. 91. 
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I 
have been disclosed by the discovery cut-off deadline. No experts by either party 
were disclosed. We made a motion to re-open for the purpose of designating 
[them], and [Subcontractor] opposed it. So if they are going to go down the road 
of attempting to get in expert testimony at this point in time, not only have we not 
had the expert report, we've not had an opportunity to [have notice] and it 
prejudices us substantially. 
( 
MR. MARTIN: May I respond, Your Honor? 
THE COURT: Just a minute. 
( 
MR. MARTIN: Okay. 
THE COURT: Yes. 
i 
MR. MARTIN: Rule 701 allows a lay witness to give opinion and inferences that 
are rationally based on his perception. His opinions and inferences are rationally 
based on his perception. They are helpful to a clear understanding of his 
testimony, or a determination of a fact in issue and not based on scientific, ^ 
technical or other specialized knowledge. I am simply trying to ask Mr. Payne 
what he did and why he did what he did. 
THE COURT: Well, let me make sure I - - It's hard to, you know, when you are 
sitting here and not familiar with all of these. I realize I've done some motions on 
it, so [Contractor's] position is, with respect to this boiler, that first, I guess, it 
wasn't - - there was no need to change it? 
MR. CHAMBERS: No. I think [Contractor's] position is that they proceeded to 
change the boiler, without following the contract provisions. 
THE COURT: Without notice, okay. So you're not going to have anybody say 
anything about the boiler, other than notice and such? { 
MR. CHAMBERS: I - - we were foreclosed by the time we took Bret 
Christiansen's deposition. We were denied the opportunity to go out and get any 
i 
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other contrary evidence, tha t . . . we'd made the motion to re-open. Let me also 
just indicate, we did some research on this and, may I approach?11 
THE COURT: Sure. 
MR. CHAMBERS: We - - This is an interesting case because it deals directly 
with what Mr. Martin indicated about 701 and the use of lay witnesses to give 
some expertise testimony based on their perception. What this case [State v. 
Rothlisberger] does is indicate that Utah, basically, adopts the narrow viewpoint 
on what expert testimony is and if it's based on, and I'm reading from paragraph 
11 on page 7, if it involves scientific, technical or other specialized knowledge, 
then it is expert testimony that has to comport with the rules. Rule 26 and, you 
know, I'm going to be very honest with the Court. I've raised this issue with Mr. 
Martin and I suspected that it would [create] a great deal of frustration for the 
Court on both of us because we didn't designate experts and it sort of deprives 
you, but, of a certain scope of this, but that is what it is. 
THE COURT: Well, I mean, you know, again, I obviously don't see the end from 
the beginning at this point because I don't have the understanding of the case you 
do, but it seems to me that even without an expert, they ought to be able to come 
in here and say why we changed the boiler. It may be wrong, and I realize and I 
agree it's something of an opinion, but he's licensed. He has experience and 
it's not, I mean, what I'm going to hear, I think, about what he's going to say is I 
changed it because I didn't think it did this or that, or it was incompatible with this 
or that, and it wouldn't function properly with this or that. Then, again, I mean, I 
wouldn't accept that as necessarily correct, but that's why he did it. 
I mean, I don't think they ought to be restricted to come in and saying we 
changed the boiler, without any explanation, and really, again, your - - if I'm 
understanding what you are telling me, your position in it isn't that necessarily 
they shouldn't have. They simply didn't follow the contract procedures. So, 
again, I don't see that he's, I mean, I don't know that he can convince me with his 
level of expertise. Maybe it is so technical that he can't do it. [...] 
Though not reflected in the transcript, counsel for Contractor and Owner here 
provided the trial court and opposing counsel with a copy of State v. Rothlisberger, 2004 
UT App 226, 95 P.3d 1193, discussed below. 
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( 
R. 899, pp. 91-95 (emphasis added by Appellants). 
Similar objections were made as to the testimony of Rusty Shoemake. See R. 899, 
pp. 236, 241, 245, 251, 255. Rusty Shoemake's testimony went far beyond lay 
knowledge or common experience; the trial court also treated Mr. Shoemake as an expert ^ 
witness based on his testimony of 25 years of experience (see R. 899, pp. 254-55): 
Mr. Martin: Well, Okay. If you had to grade Shamrock's performance of 
work on the project, what would you grade it? ( 
Mr. Chambers: Object, foundation. 
The Court: Overruled. He stated his experience of some 25 years, so -
Mr. Shoemake: I would grade them a B+ or A- in my professional opinion. 
< 
Besides the above opinion testimony, the other portions of Mr. Shoemake's 
testimony that fall within the realm of expert testimony, and which should have been 
inadmissible, are as follows: < 
1. That in his opinion Subcontractor complied with construction schedule "to 
the best of their ability." R. 899, p. 240. 
2. That it was beyond Subcontractor's ability to make up for schedule delays. ( 
R. 899, p. 241. 
3. That the schedule delays were caused by design issues on the building. R. 
899, p. 241. " 
4. That Subcontractor bore no fault in the delay. R. 899, p. 241. 
5. That Subcontractor provided adequate manpower to the job. R. 899, p. 
245.
 ( 
6. That Subcontractor did not delay the project. R. 899, p. 245. 
7. That in his professional opinion there was no way Subcontractor could have 
finished on time. R. 899, pp. 245-46. < 
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8. That there was a scheduling delay of seven to ten weeks due to a design-
steel issue. R. 899, p. 247. 
9. That Subcontractor was delayed by the design-steel issue. R. 899, p. 247. 
10. That even though Subcontractor had not asked to extend the substantial 
completion deadline that "In a professional manner one should have been 
given Subcontractor." R. 899, p. 251. 
11. That in his opinion the delays were caused by Contractor. No examples 
were provided, but purely opinion testimony. R. 899, p. 252. 
12. That it was never possible for Subcontractor to meet its contractual 
substantial completion deadline of September 20, 2004. R. 899, p. 252. 
Similar expert testimony, over Appellants' counsel's objection, was also allowed 
as to the testimony of Bill Payne (see R. 899, pp. 86, 100, 106-7, 112, 118, 135, 137) and 
Bret Christiansen (see R. 899, pp. 197-202). 
1. Expert Testimony by Witnesses Payne, Shoemake, and Christiansen Should 
Not Have Been Allowed Without Prior Disclosures Required under Utah R. 
Civ. P. 26(a)(3)(A). 
In Drew v. Lee, 2011 UT 15, 678 Utah Adv. Rep. 4, the Utah Supreme Court 
explained the purpose of Utah R. Civ. P. 26 and the provisions of (a)(3)(A) and (a)(3)(B). 
The Drew Court found that both provisions served to provide "opposing parties a 
reasonable opportunity to prepare for an effective cross examination" of an expert, and 
that this "purpose is preserved because parties are still required to identify their experts 
under Rule 26(a)(3)(A), and opposing counsel can use a variety of discovery rules to 
obtain all the information needed to question the expert at trial." Id. at If 28 (citation 
omitted). See also Turner v. Nelson, 872 P.2d 1021, 1023 (Utah 1994)(explaining that 
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pretrial witness disclosure rules provide an opposing party with the opportunity to 
"investigate] the witnesses] testimony" and "prepar[e] an effective cross-examination"). 
While addressing a similar issue arising in the context of a criminal case, this 
Court in State v. Rothlisberger provided valuable guidance in distinguishing between lay 
witness testimony that is "rationally based on the perception of the witness" and 
governed by Utah R. Evid. 701, and expert testimony that is based on "scientific, 
technical, or other specialized knowledge" governed by Utah R. Evid. 702. 
Rothlisberger, 2004 UT App 226, f 11, 95 P.3d 1193, decision affd., 2006 UT 49, 147 
P.3d 1176. Accord, Pete v. Youngblood, 2006 UT App 303, 141 P.3d 629. 
The Court in Rothlisberger adopted a "narrow interpretive approach" in 
determining whether a witness must be designated as an expert "to testify regarding a 
particular subject." Id. at j^ 15. In doing so, the Court held that if testimony is "beyond 
the realm of common experience of a juror" that it is expert testimony: 
"[...] [W]e think it is clear that when a witness seeks to testify regarding 
matters that are necessarily based on that witness's scientific, technical, or 
specialized knowledge, that witness must be qualified as an expert under 
rule 702 of the Utah Rules of Evidence, and all reliability, reporting, or 
otherwise applicable statutory commands must then be followed with 
respect to that testimony. 
Id. at 120 (internal quotations omitted and emphasis added). 
At issue in Rothlisberger was whether a police officer's testimony "regarding the 
significance o f a "quantity of methamphetamine found" was based on "scientific, 
technical, or other specialized knowledge." Id. at ^ 23. After holding that the testimony 
did constitute expert testimony, the Court concluded that the trial court abused its 
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discretion by characterizing it as lay witness testimony and admitting it even though the 
State did not comply with expert witness notice and designation requirements. 
Like Rothlisberger, this case presents a situation where, after the appropriate 
objection was made to the testimony of Payne, Shoemake, and Christiansen, the trial 
court determined that the testimony in question was not inadmissible expert testimony, 
but admissible lay witness testimony. See, e.g., R. 899, pp. 106-08, 91-95. The subject 
matter of the testimony in question, however, was far "beyond the realm of common 
experience of a common juror," and plainly constituted expert testimony. See 
Rothlisberger, 2004 UT App 226, Tj 26. Because these witnesses were never designated 
as expert witnesses pursuant to Utah R. Civ. P. 26(a)(3)(A), the testimony should have 
been excluded. The trial court abused its discretion by allowing expert testimony under 
the guise of lay witness testimony, and the objections raised by counsel for Contractor 
and Owner should have been sustained. 
2. Since Inappropriate Expert Testimony Was Admitted at the Trial, a New 
Trial Should Have Been Granted under Utah R. Civ. P. 59. 
Utah R. Civ. P. 59 allows for a new trial on the following grounds: 
(a)(1) Irregularity in the proceedings of the court, jury or adverse party, or any 
order of the court, or abuse of discretion by which either party was prevented from 
having a fair trial. 
[...] 
(a)(3) Accident or surprise, which ordinary prudence could not have guarded 
against. 
In Rothlisberger, the relevant statute dealing with expert notice requirements was Utah 
Code Ann. §77-17-13(2003). 
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(a)(7) Error in law. 
The trial court, as detailed above, erred by allowing expert testimony from 
witnesses who had never been properly designated as such under Utah R. Civ. P. 26. As 
Contractor and Owner were unable to anticipate the use of expert testimony at trial by 
Subcontractor (since Subcontractor had not designated any such experts), the expert 
testimony amounted to surprise against which Contractor and Owner could not have 
guarded, even exercising ordinary prudence. 
The testimony in question significantly affected the outcome of the trial. Prior to 
trial, the trial court granted Contractor partial summary judgment, finding that the 
subcontract was unambiguous and that Subcontractor had breached the subcontract as it 
did not timely complete its work. R. 539-40. Subsequent to Mr. Shoemake's testimony, 
however, the trial court found the subcontract to be ambiguous with regard to the 
substantial completion date and provisions allowing Contractor to schedule and 
coordinate work with all of the subcontractors on the jobsite. See R. 675, 679, 689. 
Importantly, the trial court adopted Mr. Shoemake's opinion testimony almost entirely 
regarding delay, responsibility for delay, and the structural steel issue, finding that 
Subcontractor was relieved of the substantial completion date under the subcontract. See 
R. 679-81. The trial court came to this decision even though (1) the subcontract was 
integrated and contained provisions prohibiting any waivers or modifications except in 
writing, (2) Subcontractor never requested an extension of time, and (3) the boiler was 
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r nnlered •_>ni the supplier until 20 days before the subcontract's substantial 
completion date. R. 675, 679-681; Ex. D-2; App. B-1 
Because the trial court erred by admitting the expert testimoti) as la> > v itt less 
testii i iony? Ow iiei: and Contr i .ctoi did not recei\ e tl le be iieflt of the mandatory disclosure 
requirements of Utah R. Civ. P. 26(a)(3)(A) and (B), and were deprived of the 
opportunity to prepare for trial by investigating the witness's testimony or to prepare an 
effectiv e cross -examination 
Following trial, Owner and Contractor moved for a new trial alleging the trial 
court's admission of this testimony resulted in \%w t nfar 4 ial R. 830-4?. While the trial 
court has broad discretion uling upu; *;- t .' * * 
Ret ilty. \ ;:'ii ;" 2 0 0 3 I J 1 4 ; , ! v \ IMIU reasonable basis exists for the 
decision not to grant the new trial in light of the expert testimony introduced through 
Subcontractor's witnesses. These witnesses were never designated as experts (see 
were subjected to surprise testimony against which they could not guard. The opinion of 
Subcontractor's expert witnesses significantly affected the trial court's decision. See R. 
should have been granted a new trial, and the judgment against them set aside. 
CONCLUSION 
the Coi n t of Appeals reverse the trial court and order a new trial. In addition, Owner and 
Contractor request that the Court of Appeals reverse the trial court's Conclusions of Law 
A 5 
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regarding the interpretation and application of the contract, remanding the matter to the 
trial court for a determination as to the exact amount Contractor was entitled to withhold. 
Upon remand, Owner and Contractor request specific instructions that the contract 
expressly allows Contractor to withhold payment from the Subcontractor to enforce the 
subcontract, including collection costs and attorney fees incurred to remedy the 
Subcontractor's breach. These attorney fees and collection costs should be determined 
and calculated as contractual damages, pursuant to the parties' agreement. 
Furthermore, for the reasons set forth above in Argument II, the trial court should 
be reversed as to the prejudgment interest awarded to Subcontractor. 
Lastly, Owner and Contractor request an award of their attorney fees incurred on 
appeal, also to be included as contractual damages. 
6—-
DATED this^j^day of April 2011. 
HARRIS, PRESTON & CHAMBERS 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 




STAR MOUNTAIN CONSTRUCTION, ED 
ZITE, SILVER BARON PARTNERS LC, 
DAEDALUS USA INC, et.al, 
Defendants. 
RULING and ORDER 
Case No. 050500453 
Judge BRUCE C. LUBECK 
DATE: December 4, 2009 
The above matter came before the court for decision on 
motion for Daedalus and Silver Baron (Daedalus) for partial 
summary judgment and a motion in limine. 
Daedalus filed these motions October 20, 2009. Plaintiff 
filed an opposition response on November 4, 2009. Daedalus filed 
a reply on November 30, 2009. A request to submit was filed by 
plaintiff on November 30, 2009. Based thereon oral argument was 
mistakenly scheduled for February 2, 2010. Trial in this matter 
is set for January 20, 2010. 
After the matter was scheduled, the court began its 
examination of the file. The court has determined that oral 
argument would not benefit the court. Neither party requested a 
hearing and the issues are such that the court will decide them 
based on the pleadings. 
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ARGUMENTS 
Daedalus moves the court for an order limiting Shamrock, 
cross claim plaintiff, from introducing certain evidence and 
seeks a determination from the court that Shamrock breached its 
contract with Daedalus in May 2004 when Shamrock determined the 
plans were deficient and failed to provide written notice to 
Daedalus; when Shamrock failed to complete the subcontract work 
by September 20, 2004; that Shamrock cannot claim damages because 
of waiver and estoppel; and Shamrock is liable to Daedalus or 
Silver Baron for lost revenue and damages of at least $678,160 
because Shamrock failed to complete the subcontract work timely 
and so the building was unable to be delivered to a tenant, 
Premier Resorts by December 1, 2004. 
Daedalus claims as undisputed facts that Silver Baron is the 
owner of a condominium project, Daedalus is the general 
contractor, and Shamrock is a subcontractor hired by Daedalus to 
install the mechanical system, HVAC, and plumbing. The contract 
between Silver Baron and Daedalus was in December 2003 and in May 
2004 Shamrock was hired as a subcontractor, to install plumbing, 
mechanical and HVAC for just over $1.1 million. Work was to begin 
April 28, 2004, and be substantially complete by September 20, 
2004. Work was not complete until May 2005 according to 
Shamrock. Under the contract, Shamrock was to notify Daedalus if 
-2-
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Shamrock found any design deficiency. Shamrock did not give 
written notice, however, even though Shamrock has admitted it 
knew in May 2004 that the boiler was incompatible. The contract 
indicates that oral notice is not sufficient. There were three 
Change Orders which increased the contract price by just over 
$124,000. Those did not extend the time for substantial 
completion. No request was made by Shamrock for extension of 
time. Shamrock installed, without approval of Daedalus, a cheaper 
boiler. Daedalus was, under its contract with Silver Baron, to 
deliver the building to Silver Baron by November 1, 2004, or be 
subject to liquidated damages. Silver Baron had a contract with 
Premier Resorts as a tenant, which stated that if the building 
was not delivered by December 1, 2004, to Premier Resorts a 
formula would be used as to damages. Silver Baron lost $678,160 
in rents, which is prior to assessing the $400,000 liquidated 
damage provision. The mechanical system still does not function 
properly. 
From these facts Daedalus and Silver Baron argue the breach 
of Shamrock in not giving written notice of the claimed 
deficiency in design was a material breach. 
Further, there is no dispute that the project was not 
substantially complete by September 20, 2004, as Shamrock was 
working on the project at least through February 2005 and there 
is evidence work was still ongoing in May 2005. 
-3-
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The contract provides that if there is delay, from any cause 
whatever, no damages could be sought by Shamrock, but its only 
remedy was to seek an extension in writing with justification for 
the request for delay. No extension was requested by Shamrock. 
Because Shamrock failed to complete the work, Daedalus could 
not deliver the building timely, Silver Baron could not deliver 
the building to its tenant, and damages have resulted. 
In opposition Shamrock disputes several of the facts alleged 
by Daedalus. 
Shamrock asserts the contract dated May 2004 was not signed 
until June 8, 2004. 
Shamrock verbally notified Daedalus of the defect in design. 
Further, Daedalus had actual notice of the design incompatibility 
before the contract was signed and no written notice was 
required. Shamrock did not delay the project in any event. 
Daedalus requested the changes and Shamrock was not asked 
during the work to sign a Change Order. Daedalus was aware of the 
delays on an ongoing basis. 
The delays were caused by Daedalus or Silver Baron. After 
the project completion, Shamrock was asked to create documents 
after the fact. 
The change in boiler was agreed to as the parties before the 
contract discussed the incompatible boiler, and the engineer for 
-4-
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Daedalus knew 9^ the solution Shamrock chose and the architect 
for Daedalus told the inspectors that Daedalus had changed the 
system. 
Shamrock claims the boiler problems did not delay the work, 
but the failures of the boiler were the fault of the engineer, 
not Shamrock. 
Shamrock claims the system has passed inspection and is 
functioning properly. 
As additional facts Shamrock claims Silver Baron and 
Daedalus have common ownership. Daedalus caused the delays and 
did not request change orders. The failures of the system were 
defects in the pilot light, not in the installation. There was 
no chilled water system which system was the responsibility of 
Daedalus, not Shamrock. Shamrock claims substantial completion 
was by December 18, 2004, but Daedalus requested Shamrock to do 
additional work, which it did until March 2005. There were no 
requests for change orders until after completion. Daedalus' 
project engineer has stated Shamrock was not responsible for the 
delays, but Daedalus was, and that the work was done properly. 
The delays were because of structural steel changes, there was no 
water source supplied by Daedalus, the water heaters were 
defective, and other delays caused by Daedalus. The contract 
provides that if Daedalus believes Shamrock is not timely, 
Daedalus must give written notice the contract is null and void 
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before any delay damages may be sought. 
Shamrock argues the failure to provide written notice of the 
defect was not a material breach, as Daedalus had actual notice 
before the contract was signed. 
While the work was not done by September 20, 2004, that was 
the fault of Daedalus, not Shamrock. 
Daedalus did not give notice to terminate the contract and 
the work was not untimely. Shamrock claims Daedalus has breached 
the covenant of good faith and fair dealing. 
In reply Daedalus largely repeats its prior arguments and 
refutes Shamrock's attempts to show by extrinsic evidence that 
the breaches were not Shamrock's fault. 
DISCUSSION 
As to the summary judgment motion, Daedalus moves for 
summary judgment on issues on which it bears the burden of proof 
at trial-that Shamrock breached the contract. Thus, Daedalus 
must show there is no issue of material fact. Upon that showing 
Shamrock must show there is a genuine issue for trial. Orvis v. 
Johnson, 111 P.3d 600 (UT 2008). 
The most recent definitive pronouncement on extrinsic 
evidence as it relates to integrated contracts is found in 
Tangren Family ?Trust v. Tangren, 2008 UT 20. 
-6-
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There our Supreme Court disapproved and overruled many prior 
cases, some discussed by these parties, containing language 
contrary to Tangren. 
The Supreme Court made clear that a trial court must first 
determine whether an agreement is integrated. If it is 
integrated, then parol evidence may be admitted only if the court 
makes a subsequent determination that the language of the 
agreement is ambiguous. Formerly, for a court to determine if a 
contract is integrated, the court could examine any evidence. 
Here, the subcontractor agreement between Daedalus and Shamrock, 
contains a clear integration clause in paragraph 29. It provides 
a mechanism, through Change Orders, if there are to be changes in 
the scope and cost of work. Thus, the court must.conclude that 
the agreement is integrated. The court under Tangren does not now 
consider further evidence to see if a contract is integrated 
unless certain other conditions exist. 
An examination by the court of the subcontractor agreement 
at issue reveals no ambiguity in the relevant terms or 
provisions, and Shamrock has not argued there is ambiguity. 
The next step, as announced in Tangrenr is to determine the 
claims of the parties. "Where a contract by an explicit term 
purports to be integrated, we will nevertheless allow extrinsic 
evidence in support of an argument that the contract is not, in 
fact, valid for certain reasons we have specified. We have held 
-7-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
that extrinsic evidence is appropriately considered, even in the 
face of a clear integration clause, where the contract is alleged 
to be a forgery, a joke, a sham, lacking in consideration, or 
where a contract is voidable for fraud, duress, mistake, or 
illegality. By their very nature, these bases for invalidation of 
a contract are not necessarily provable by a reference to the 
contract itself." As in Tangren, here Shamrock does not even 
allege, nor argue, that this contract is invalid for one of these 
named reasons. "Thus, we will not allow extrinsic evidence of a 
separate agreement to be considered on the question of 
integration in the face of a clear integration clause. To the 
extent any of our prior cases provide otherwise, we overrule 
those cases." 
The court next, under Tangren, must determine if the 
agreement is ambiguous. "Ambiguity exists in a contract term or 
provision if it is capable of more than one reasonable 
interpretation because of uncertain meanings of terms, missing 
terms, or other facial deficiencies. . . . [W]e determine the 
meaning of a general contractual term based on the specific 
•enumerations that surround that term." Cafe Rio Inc v. Larkin-
Gifford-Overton LLC, 2009 UT 6. 
Thus, here, Shamrock's attempt to create a factual dispute 
-8-
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about some of the terms is unavailing. 
The court concludes that indeed it is undisputed that 
Shamrock did not inform Daedalus in writing that there was a 
defect in design. That failure was a breach of a clear term of 
the contract, paragraph 10. 
However, whether that breach is .material is at this point 
largely a question of fact. The breach must be material for any 
claim of damages to be viable. Shamrock has succeeded in creating 
in the mind of the court a factual dispute about whether that 
breach is material. The factual dispute exists because if in 
fact Daedalus had actual knowledge of the incompatibility of the 
equipment, and agreed with Shamrock to seek a solution, the 
failure to give written notice would not be material. The court 
believes that the facts surrounding that issue are in genuine 
dispute. While the agreement makes time of the essence, Shamrock 
has provided evidence, though not with the precision better 
achieved by citation to a specific document or portion of 
deposition, which creates a genuine issue of material fact as to 
whether that breach is material. 
Similarly, as to the claim that Shamrock did not complete 
the work by September 20, 2004. Shamrock acknowledges that and • 
that was also a breach. Paragraph 7 sets a substantial completion 
date of September 20, 2004. Shamrock acknowledges the work was 
-9-
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not done but asserts it is because of Daedalus' conduct. The 
contract provides for a mechanism to achieve change, and that is 
contained in paragraphs 9 and 10. Those paragraphs make clear 
that Shamrock must in writing request extensions and if Shamrock 
does additional work, and expects to be paid, those provisions 
must be complied with. The contract is meant to avoid the very 
thing occurring in this case, a subcontractor claiming that the 
work was not timely because of the general contractor. The 
contract, as guided by the law set forth in Tangren, does not 
allow Shamrock to now claim it was late in its completion because 
the contractor orally asked Shamrock to do other work. Neither 
party is unsophisticated as indicated by the nature of this 
contract and it being over a one million dollar agreement. 
Shamrock admits there were no change orders and no requests in 
writing for extensions of the completion date. Even though 
Shamrock has shown other evidence, claiming that the delay was 
the fault of Daedalus, that evidence as parol evidence cannot be 
considered in this instance to defeat the claim there was a 
breach because time was of the essence and there are written 
provisions governing how to avoid such issues as this. The time 
of completion is certainly material without further factual 
i 
development. 
Thus, the motion for partial summary judgment is GRANTED in 
i 
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part and DENIED in part. The court finds and concludes as above, 
that the work was not completed timely and that Shamrock has 
breached the contract on that issue. The court finds and 
concludes also that Shamrock did not give written notice of 
deficiencies, that was a breach but the question of the 
materiality of that breach remains for trial. 
As to the other requests of Daedalus, the motion in limine, 
that must be DENIED. 
Shamrock is entitled to present evidence surrounding the 
facts as the facts relate to the claim for damages by each party. 
The amount of damages Daedalus claims is dependent upon the 
completion date and the date which the building became available 
for Silver Baron and then for its tenant, Premier Resorts. Those 
dates in turn are dependent on the facts related to WHY the 
building became available on those dates. Even though the 
contract specifies a set completion date, and the court has ruled 
Shamrock may not by parol or extrinsic evidence seek to justify 
that delay and thus demonstrate there was no breach, the court 
does believe there is a factual dispute about the date of 
completion and the reasons for that date of completion. Allowing 
Shamrock to explain WHY the delay occurred goes to the question 
of what damages may flow from the breach of failure to timely 
complete the work. 
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Thus, the motion in limine seeking to disallow Shamrock from 
introducing evidence as to Shamrock's damages is DENIED. The 
court will allow Shamrock to present evidence, again NOT to 
demonstrate that there was no breach of the timeliness 
requirement in the contract, but as to the reasons for such delay 
as that evidence relates directly to the damage claims of each 
party. If the evidence shows some of the fault for the delay is 
the result of Daedalus' conduct, the date of occupation of the 
building and the amount of damages is directly impacted. If none 
of the fault belongs to Daedalus, damages proven for delay would 
be visited upon Shamrock solely. 
The court cannot now determine that there is no factual 
dispute about the amount of damages. Shamrock has, though a bit 
in artfully, created a genuine issue of material fact. There is a 
genuine issue of material fact about the amount of any damage to 
either party because there is a fundamental dispute about who 
caused the delay in completion and what proportion of the delay 
is attributable to either party. 
This Ruling and Order is the Order of the court and no other 
order is required. 
WHEN TRIAL WAS SET THE PARTIES INDICATED THEY NEEDED FOUR 
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Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
DAYS. GIVEN THE COURT'S CRIMINAL CALENDAR, TRIAL WAS SET FOR 
JANUARY 20, 21, 22 AND THE FOLLOWING WEDNESDAY JANUARY 27, 2010. 
AGAIN BECAUSE OF THAT CRIMINAL CALENDAR AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL 
RIGHT TO A SPEEDY CRIMINAL TRIAL, THE COURT HAS HAD TO SCHEDULE 
TWO CRIMINAL FELONY TRIALS FOR JANUARY 27, 2010. THIS CASE MUST 
BE TRIED AND COMPLETED ON JANUARY 20, 21, AND 22, 2010. COUNSEL 
AND THE PARTIES MUST GEAR THEIR PRESENTATIONS TO THIS NEW 
SCHEDULE.• 
DATED this day of , 2009, 
BRUCE C. LUBECK 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 




SHAMROCK PLUMBING, LLC, et.al., 
Defendant. 
SHAMROCK PLUMBING LLC, 
Cross claim plaintiff, 
vs. 
SILVER BARON PARTNERS, LC; 
DAEDALUS USA INC.; FRED W. 
FAIRCLOUGH; and CHRISTINE 
FAIRCLOUGH, 
Cross claim defendants. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
Case No. 050500453 
Judge BRUCE C. LUBECK 
DATE: January 29, 2010 
The above mat ter came before the court for a bench t r i a l on 
January 20, 21, and 22, 2010. 
Third par ty p l a i n t i f f (hereinaf ter plaintiff)Shamrock was 
present through Mel S. Martin and cross claim defendants Daedalus 
and Si lver Baron (here inaf te r defendants) were present through 
Joseph M. Chambers and Josh Chambers. 
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BACKGROUND 
White Cap as plaintiff filed this case September 2, 2005. 
The complaint alleged in summary that it was a subcontractor to 
Daedalus on a project in early 2004 . Shamrock was alleged to 
claim an interest in the property through a lien Shamrock had 
filed. 
On October 13, 2005, Shamrock filed an answer and cross 
claim against Silver Baron, Daedalus, and Fred and Christine 
Fairclough. 
Shamrock in its causes of action (1) sought to foreclose a 
mechanic's lien, alleging that Daedalus as general contractor and 
agent of Silver Baron contracted with Shamrock to provide 
plumbing and mechanical materials and services. Shamrock began 
work April 26, 2004, and the last work was March 8, 2005. 
Shamrock claimed $275,128 and that it had not been paid. On March 
23, 2005, Shamrock recorded a lien and sent notice to Silver 
Baron. Other claims are (2) breach of contract, (3) quantum 
meruit, and (4) failure to bond by Silver Baron under UCA 14-2-1. 
The case brought by White Cap was dismissed against all 
defendants, except Shamrock, on November 7, 2005. Shamrock was 
dismissed as a defendant on December 5, 2005. Thus, only these 
claims by Shamrock and Daedalus and Silver Baron remain. 
On February 15, 2006, default certificates were entered 
against all cross claim defendants. Those were set aside April 
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18, 2006 after motion. 
These cross claim defendants Silver Baron and Daedalus filed 
an answer and counter claim against Shamrock for (1) breach of 
contract alleging Shamrock did not timely do its work under their 
sub contract with Daedalus, under which Silver Baron was a third 
party beneficiary. Further, the work was not done properly. 
Shamrock filed an answer to the counterclaim on May 15, 
2006. 
Almost a year later a motion was filed by Silver Baron and 
the court on June 20, 2007, dismissed Shamrock's lien foreclosure 
claim as untimely. A case management order was entered in 
December 2007. It was amended by stipulation in June 2008 and 
again in September 2008. 
On April 29, 2008, the Faircloughs were dismissed. 
After motion by Shamrock, and withdrawal of counsel for 
defendants, an order was entered March 5, 2009, striking the 
counter claim and answer of defendants and judgment was entered 
for Shamrock in the amount of $418,095. Shortly thereafter new 
and current counsel entered and that judgment, after motion, was 
set aside April 23, 2009. The court did grant Shamrock attorney 
fees in the sum of $5500. 
On July 21, 2009, this trial date was scheduled. 
Thereafter various motions were filed and after oral 
argument the court on December 4, 2009, the court concluded the 
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work was not timely done by Shamrock under the contract and that 
no written notice of deficiency was given by Shamrock and that 
was a breach, but that such issue remained open as to whether 
that was a material breach. The court further ruled Shamrock 
could present its evidence as the claimed damages of Daedalus 
were dependent on the completion date and why that was the date 
of completion and why it was not achieved. The court ruled the 
amount of damages was in dispute and must be tried. 
On December 31, 2009,1 Shamrock moved to prevent the 
testimony of certain witnesses. The court issued a brief ruling 
on January 15, 2010. On the morning of the first day of trial 
defendants also moved to exclude and objected to various 
witnesses and exhibits. The court ruled orally that it would 
hear the testimony and allow objections to be lodged during the 
trial. 
The court heard evidence, received exhibits, heard argument 
of counsel, and is fully advised. The court took the matter under 
advisement. 
The court finds as follows: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Silver Baron owned The Lodges at Deer Valley and hired 
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Daedalus as the general contractor for Building F. The project 
was a luxury condominium hotel in Deer Valley. Daedalus hired 
Shamrock as a sub-contractor to do mechanical and plumbing work. 
Currently Daedalus is owned 75% by Lynn Padan and 25% by Alan 
Wright. Silver Baron is now dissolved. During the time involved 
in this case, 2004 and 2005, Daedalus was a member of Silver 
Baron along with Padan and several others. This was design-build 
project in which Daedalus participated in design, not as the 
general contractor but as a consultant, then the architect EMA 
made plans, presented them to Silver Baron, and Silver Baron 
selected Daedalus as the general contractor, who hired many 
subcontractors, including Shamrock. 
2. Shamrock and Daedalus signed a contract June 7, 2004, but 
Shamrock actually had begun work in April 2004. Neither party 
offered an explanation as to why the contract was signed well 
after the work began by Shamrock. The court finds that during 
that time, before the actual signing of the contract in June 
2004, Daedalus went over the sub-contract with Shamrock, through 
Shamrock's representative Payne, and stressed time frames because 
as will be found below Daedalus had a contract with Silver Baron, 
who had a contract with Premier Resorts for occupancy of the 
units. The sub-contract at issue has exhibits and refers to 
drawings and specifications. Among those are the engineering 
specifications completed by Colvin Engineering, who had a 
-5-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
contract with EMA, the architect who had a contract with and was 
hired by Silver Baron. AME and Silver Baron had a contract, and 
AME and Colvin had a contract. Bill Payne was the principle 
Shamrock project manager. Rusty Shoemake was the project 
supervisor for Daedalus and Roy Bartee was the project manager 
for Daedalus. The "chain of command" for Daedalus was thus Rusty 
Shoemake as the supervisor who reported to Bartee, a licensed 
architect, the manager who reported to Wright the vice president 
who reported to Padan the president. All have considerable and 
impressive experience in the construction field. 
3. The sub-contract was for the base amount of $1,119,083. 
It provided for changes and those are the main issues in this 
case. This case presents the seemingly ever-present tension and 
conflict between contractors and sub-contractors. 
4. The sub-contract provided, at paragraph 10: 
In the event Subcontractor finds any design deficiency, 
error in measurements, or errors in the Contract Documents 
or conditions which Subcontractor believes to be at variance 
with approved plans, Subcontractor shall have an absolute 
duty to immediately provide written notice thereof to 
Contractor. Contractor shall have the right at any time to 
make changes to drawings and in the subcontract work. If any 
changes cause a material increase or decrease in the amount 
of work, Subcontractor agrees to accept any such changes 
subject to this paragraph and to proceed without delay in 
the Subcontract Work, Subcontractor shall submit a written 
claim for any required adjustment to the Contract Amount 
with a breakdown, supporting invoices and/or quotes. If 
Contractor and Subcontractor cannot agree on the amount of 
the addition or deletion, the dispute for adjustment shall 
be submitted to binding arbitration in Summit County, Utah, 
and Subcontractor shall nevertheless and unconditionally 
proceed with the material changes, if directed by Contractor 
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during the pendency of arbitration. If Subcontractor makes 
such changes or any other changes to the Subcontract Work 
without written direction from Contractor, such changes 
constitutes an agreement by Subcontractor that it will not 
be paid for that changed work and Subcontractor shall be 
liable for any and all losses, costs, expenses, damages, and 
liability of any nature whatsoever associated with or in any 
way arising out of any such change made without written 
direction from Contractor. (Emphasis added). 
The subcontract work under the contract means all work required 
to be performed by Subcontractor under the Sub-contract. 
4. The Sub-Contract provided the subcontract work was to 
commence April 26, 2004, and be substantially completed by 
September 20, 2004. It stated time was of the essence. The Sub-
contract also provided, at paragraph 9, that contractor had the 
right to revise the Contract Schedule to accommodate changes in 
conditions affecting the work. At paragraph 3 the Sub-contract 
provided that subcontractor had examined all the Contract 
Documents, which included the specifications and schedules 
relevant to do the subcontract work. 
5. The Sub-contract at paragraph 15 provided the procedure 
if contractor believed there was a default. If contractor 
believed the subcontractor failed to follow supervision, to do 
the work timely, to correct deficiencies when requested, to pay 
its workers or material men, to provide adequate labor or 
materials to meet schedules, to attend progress meetings, or 
other wise failed to perform any covenant, contractor could, 
without terminating the subcontract, give a two working day 
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written notice declare the Sub-contract null and void and do any 
or all of the following: (1) assess delay penalties of $1500 per 
day for each day the subcontract work remained incomplete, (2) 
supply its own workers or materials and charge costs to 
subcontractor and include 20% profit, (3) contract with other 
subcontractors and charge the cost to subcontractor, (4) withhold 
payment, (5) use tools and implements of subcontractor or (6) 
file a legal action for damages including consequential damages 
and loss of profits, including those for liquidated damages or 
consequential damages for which contractor may be liable to third 
parties. 
6. Daedalus never provided such written notice nor declared 
the contract null and void. Daedalus claims it issued a written 
notice by email, but could not find it. The court finds 
otherwise that there was no written notice nor was the contract 
ever declared null and void as Daedalus has failed to prove that 
by a preponderance of the evidence. 
7. Under paragraph 17 of the Sub-contract contractor could 
withhold payment to protect contractor from loss, including costs 
and attorney fees, on account of defective subcontractor work not 
remedied and for other reasons. It provided that attorney fees 
could be sought if incurred enforcing the subcontract. 
8. Exhibit B to the Subcontract, Specified Provisions, was 
incorporated into the Subcontract. It provided, among other 
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things, in paragraph 1 ( c ) , that subcontractor was to attend 
weekly progress meetings. 
Furthermore, and not withstanding anything in this 
Subcontract Agreement to the contrary, Subcontractor agrees 
to be bound by such modifications to the Project Schedule as 
are discussed at the weekly progress meetings unless written 
objection is made by Subcontractor within 48 hours of the 
occurrence of such meeting. 
9. The engineering specifications, part of the Contract 
Documents, called for a Bryant boiler and A.O. Smith water 
heaters. At some point in time this became problematic. 
10. In April 2004, before the Subcontract was signed, 
Shamrock determined that those two items (boiler and water 
heaters) were incompatible and would not function properly 
together and would create a danger for human safety due to the 
incompatible venting process. The Bryant boiler had a positive 
pressure flue and the water heaters had an atmospheric pressure 
flue and they are not compatible and would cause dangerous 
situations. 
11. An exhibit shows that Daedalus on April 26, 2004, 
provided a work schedule to Shamrock which provided the plumbing 
work was to be done by October 1, 2004, and the mechanical work 
was to be done by November 11, 2004. Those dates of course vary 
from the Sub-contract dates of substantial completion by 
September 20, 2004. Thus, the court finds and concludes that the 
contract documents are ambiguous as subject to two reasonable 
interpretations as to the time of completion and thus the trial 
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was needed to determine the intent of the parties. While the time 
schedule provided on April 26, 2004, is not a contract document, 
the Sub-contract makes clear that contractor can adjust the 
schedule and subcontractor is to follow it. Overall the court 
finds that the time schedule in the Sub-contract is ambiguous 
because of that feature of the Sub-contract. 
12. The sequencing of events appears clear to the parties 
but not to the court. The court cannot find that any of the 
parties are wilfully misleading the court yet the evidence is in 
conflict. While it is the role of the court as fact finder to 
reconcile those conflicts as best as can be accomplished, the 
burden of proof in this case lies with each party on their 
claims. The timing of some things remains unproven by the 
parties and unknown by a preponderance of the evidence to the 
court. Yet, the court finds that before the Sub-contract was 
signed, sometime in April 2004, Shamrock through Payne advised 
Bartee of Daedalus that the boiler and water heaters were 
incompatible and would not work together. Bartee told Shamrock to 
work it out with Colvin, the mechanical engineer. The court, 
unless it wholly rejects the testimony of Colvin's representative 
Bret Christiansen, cannot find Christiansen was even on the 
project then in April 2004. The court finds Christiansen did not 
even appear on the scene for Colvin until much later, well after 
the contract was signed. That is based on the testimony of 
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Christiansen himself, backed up by Wright who said Christiansen 
was only on site at the end of the project for a month. The 
court finds thus that Shamrock did not advise Colvin until 
shortly before Shamrock ordered the boiler. Christiansen 
testified, and the court credits that testimony, that Shamrock 
approached Colvin about installing a different boiler from the 
specifications, different from the Bryant boiler. Colvin was 
advised by Shamrock that installing another boiler would be 
faster and it would not be more expensive and there would be a 
delay in obtaining the Bryant boiler. Colvin at first indicated 
that should not be done but then relented and that is when, on 
September 1, 2004, Shamrock first ordered the boiler. Shamrock 
ordered a Rite boiler on September 1, 2004. The court finds that 
at the time of the contract, Shamrock did not directly advise 
Daedalus at the time of the contract of the incompatibility of 
the two systems and Shamrock should have done such. The court 
finds and concludes that given the strong language of paragraph 
10, emphasized above by the court, that Shamrock had an absolute 
duty to advise contractor in writing of a change in equipment or 
design deficiency. The burden was on Shamrock to obtain that 
approval FROM CONTRACTOR, not from an engineer with whom Shamrock 
had no contract. While obviously Bartee could have and should 
have done more to follow through, the court concludes that under 
the Sub-contract it was Shamrock's responsibility to obtain 
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Daedalus' consent by advising Daedalus in writing, and that duty 
under the contract was not fulfilled by an oral statement well 
before the contract was even signed. Even if Shamrock is correct 
that at the time of advising Daedalus there was no written 
contract, that duty arose when the contract was signed. If, as 
Shamrock claims, the possible danger of having an incompatible 
system was life threatening, the court finds and concludes that 
the duty on Shamrock, negotiated for by Daedalus, is clear. 
13. The court has already ruled on December 4, 2009, on 
motion for summary judgment, that the subcontract was 
unambiguous. That, after presentation of the facts at trial, was 
wrong at least in part. The court determined it was not disputed 
that Shamrock had not provided a written notice of a deficiency 
in the design as required by paragraph 10 and that such was a 
breach, and the court now finds, as above, that factually and 
legally that is still correct. The court reserved and found there 
was a factual issue about whether that breach was material, 
which is a question of law for the court but the court needed 
further factual development to make that determination. The 
court also determined that there had not been substantial 
completion of the work by September 20, 2004, and that remains 
true and undisputed. The court allowed evidence, and thus this 
trial, to allow evidence to be presented to determine if the 
failure to substantially complete the work under the contract 
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affected the damage claims of the parties. The reasons for the 
delay were to be factually determined. 
14. The last work done was in March 2005 and a lien was 
filed by Shamrock. The lien foreclosure claim of Shamrock was 
dismissed because it was not timely enforced. 
15. Daedalus had a deadline to turn the project over to 
Silver Baron who had a contract with Premier to allow Premier to 
lease the units for the holiday season, and thereafter, so the 
project was on a deadline and time was of the essence. 
16. Under the Daedalus-Silver Baron prime contract, signed 
in 2003, the project was to be turned over to Silver Baron by 
November 1, 2004, but that was later negotiated, evidently orally 
as there were no documents showing such, and extended to December 
1, 2004. Under paragraph 2.2.5 of the prime contract, if the 
work was not done on time by Daedalus, Daedalus was to lend 
Silver Baron each month an amount equal to the difference between 
what Silver Baron would have received in rentals and the net 
revenue that Silver Baron did receive, not to exceed $400,000. 
Here, the date Silver Baron was able to actually take possession 
was December 18, 2004 rather than December 1, 2004, approximately 
one half month. Under that prime contract, if the work was done 
on time, there was no liquidated damage provision. 
17. There was a lease between Silver Baron and Premier, from 
October 2003, which relates to this. At the time of that lease 
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Snow Park was the predecessor of Silver Baron, thus the lease was 
actually between Snow Park Associates and Premier Resorts. In 
substance that allowed Snow Park (succeeded to by Silver Baron) 
to lease the premises, and Snow Park in turn leased the units to 
others and under the lease shared the profits with Silver Baron. 
It provided, in summary, in sections 2.5 and 2.6, that Snow Park 
was to be able to begin renting on December 1, 2004, which date 
was defined in the lease as the commencement date and the 
delivery of possession date, the defined possession date, was 
November 1, 2004, or when Snow Park delivered possession of the 
units to Premier, and the date was set at November 1, 2004, 
unless extended pursuant to the lease. The court finds that 
because the date in the agreement between Daedalus and Silver 
Baron was extended from November 1 to December 1, 2004 when 
Silver Baron could take possession of the building, those dates 
of the Snow Park lease were also necessarily extended as Snow 
Park could not take possession November 1, 2004, if Silver Baron 
did not have possession.until December 1, 2004. Snow Park was to 
pay a monthly base rent to Silver Baron, which was $4417 for a 
two bedroom unit and $5583 for a three bedroom unit. That was 
the fixed rate. If there was a delay in occupation beyond 
December 1, 2004, there was to be a one time extension for one 1 
year. Here, a temporary certificate of occupancy was issued 
December 22 or 23, 2004, by Park City, so Snow Park could begin 
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rentals then. If a unit was sold or removed by Snow Park, the 
agreement ceased to apply to that unit under the lease. 
18. During the work by Shamrock several changes were 
requested but only three signed change orders exist. In none of 
them did Shamrock request an extension of time to complete the 
work though the change order forms allowed a space for such a 
request to be made. 
19. During the weekly progress meetings Shamrock was often 
asked to do different work by Daedalus. 
20. The construction of the building was delayed overall by 
various factors, some of which were not of Shamrock's making or 
caused by Shamrock. The court finds from an examination of the 
work records and the testimony that Shamrock had a crew of 
varying sizes but that the work did not get done quickly enough 
to comply with the September 20, 2004, date. However, the court 
finds that the ambiguity in the contract itself, with the 
September 20, 2004 date set but in at least two other places 
(paragraph 9 and Exhibit B) that date was obviously meant to have 
some flexibility in it. The court cannot find that date was 
intended to be a fixed immovable date and it was not. Changes 
were made and other factors interfered with it, some of those not 
of Shamrock's making. There were delays "built into'' the contract 
which as noted in a schedule given by Daedalus to Shamrock called 
for the final mechanical work to be done by November 11, 2004. 
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The entire course of conduct between these parties and their 
practice shows flexibility up to a certain point, as there must 
be, depending on many circumstances in a project such as this. 
While the minutiae of the times need not be detailed, obviously 
there were other trades that were part of the delay, as well as 
Daedalus itself. For example, it is undisputed that on November 
23, 2004, Shamrock notified Daedalus that Shamrock could not. 
finish because various counter tops, cabinets, paint and tile 
were not completed in various named units and so the finish 
plumbing could not be finished in those 12 units detailed. While 
the evidence is not strong as to why that was so, November 23, 
2004, is well after the claimed September 20 substantial 
completion date and yet other trades were still not completed 
with their work so that Shamrock could complete its work. The 
court is aware that such delay occasioned by lack of cabinets or 
counter tops perhaps was only a minor delay because Shamrock had 
at that point probably only to install finish faucets and handles 
and such after counter tops are installed, a short task for a 
crew of 4-8 people. Further, though it is disputed as to its 
effect, there seems little dispute that in fact a main water line 
was not available until November 17, 2004. That is the 
responsibility of Daedalus. Even though there was another water 
line available for some purposes, the main line was not available 
until then and that was not Shamrock's responsibility. Even 
-16-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
though there is a non-waiver provision, clearly in early December 
2004 Daedalus stated that Daedalus needed the plumbing done by 
December 8 and called for increased manpower from Shamrock. The 
court generally finds in favor of Daedalus on that issue, that 
Daedalus asked for increased manpower and Shamrock did not 
provide it. However, overall the court cannot join Daedalus in 
putting the blame for the failure to turn over the project on 
December 1, 2004 to Silver Baron all on Shamrock. Clearly some 
delay was caused by Shamrock but there was some delay of an 
unknown duration in the overall project because of a structural 
steel issue about design and cost in Quadrant 3 of Building F. 
While some trades, perhaps even Shamrock, perhaps were not unduly 
delayed, the court finds that the overall project was delayed as 
much as 60 days from some of those issues apart from Shamrock, 
and that cannot all be upon Shamrock. 
21. Even though Shamrock continued to do certain repair and 
finish work into March 2005, the court finds that Shamrock had 
substantially completed its work under the Sub-contract on 
December 18, 2004. A temporary certificate of occupancy was 
issued by Park City December 22 or 23, 2004, allowing occupancy 
of the units. 
22. The buildings were occupied in December for rentals. 
Problems with the work Shamrock had done began almost 
immediately. During that time problems became evident, as the 
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units, especially on the top floor, were very hot as well as the 
hallways. . 
23. The hot water also had a problem which turned out to be 
a defective part manufactured by A.O. Smith, which recalled the 
part and replaced them, and that was not Shamrock's doing at all. 
24. Once the units were turned over to Silver Baron for 
rental by Premier, there was excess heat in the units and the 
halls. This project was heated by water circulating from the 
boiler through the units and halls, and then coil fans blew that 
radiant heated air into the units and halls. With the venting 
system installed by Shamrock, the heat of each unit was not 
controlled by a thermostat in each room. The boiler installed was 
controlled by what is called a VFD, or variable frequency driver. 
Under the leases by Premier guests paid $1000-1500 per night and 
had temperatures of 80 or 90 degrees F or above, and were told to 
open the windows by Premier agents. Most of the guest asked for 
and many received refunds. Those amounts were not shown directly 
to the court, however. 
25. After that "over heating" problem was evident, all 
involved began examining the problem, and various solutions were 
proposed, none of which worked until sometime in February 2005. 
The parties disagree on the solution. The court is obviously no 
expert but applies its common sense to the issue. Shamrock 
claims, based on the testimony of the mechanical engineer, 
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Christiansen, that the solution was basically air conditioning, 
or a chill line to combat the heat. Daedalus claims, and the 
court finds, that the problem was the installation, or lack of 
installation, of a mixer valve in the boiler water circulation 
system, 
26. On February 3, 2005, Christiansen told Daedalus, in 
summary, that chilled water piping being installed on Building F 
will cool the temperatures. The court finds based on all the 
evidence that on February 15, 2005, Wright and Padan were still 
trying solve the problem. Earlier all (Daedalus, Shamrock 
Colvin, manufacturers' representatives) had several meetings and 
no solutions to the overheating were found. Padan deduced that 
because there was only one heat source, the boiler, that must be 
the problem. It was set to heat the water at 180 degrees F. 
That boiler was manually turned down to 110 degrees and the 
building was properly cooled at that point. That, however, 
created its own problem with the boiler which would be affected 
as to its performance and longevity. Then on February 15, 2005, 
Padan and Wright went into the mechanical room at 11:30 pm. There 
they found two Shamrock employees working on the system. That is 
highly in conflict and the court does not determine the issue on 
the basis that anyone is being intentionally deceptive, but the 
documents and circumstances lead the court to these findings. 
Those employees of Shamrock were working on and installing a 
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mixer valve. Shamrock insists that was on the culinary water and 
Daedalus insists it was on this issue of overheating from the 
boiler. The court concludes that the greater amount of evidence 
supports Daedalus. First, there is a daily log of January 18, 
2005, showing receipt by Shamrock of "material for hot water heat 
loop that was missed." Then these employees were seen working at 
11:30 at night and Padan and Wright identified with photographs 
the hot water heating loop and mixer valve those men were working 
on. It is apparent from photos and the evident scorching on the 
insulation that work was done in that area after the installation 
of the insulation. Further, the daily work report log codes the 
work as "48" which is under the system of Shamrock "hot water 
piping." There are two other codes for culinary water, one under 
ground and one above ground. Those are coded as 43 and 44. This 
work done on February 15, 2005, was again coded as hot water 
piping, 48. There appear no categories for boiler work. From, 
all this, and what the court believes is a strong dose of common 
sense, the court cannot accept that hot radiant air at a high 
temperature is sent through a 84,000 square foot building and the 
only way to cool it is through a counter cool air or chiller 
pipe. It makes far more sense that the explanation of Daedalus 
personnel is the answer. The boiler had two components, one of 
which ran the water at 180 degrees and it circulated through the 
building and provided the heat. It was to be cooled by the other 
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function, cooler water that ran the culinary water, for showers 
and washing and such, at 120 degrees. In fact Shamrock had 
failed to put a mixer valve in which affected the flow of water 
through the building and the cooler water from the culinary 
system was not being mixed with the original 180 degree water and 
so the radiant air was always too hot, unless the boiler was 
turned down to 110 or some lower temperature. When that new mixer 
valve was installed, the over heating problem ceased. The court 
finds that Shamrock did not do the work properly and did not 
install that mixer valve properly originally until mid February 
2005. Again, as noted, the part arrived January 18, 2005, for a 
valve "missed." As will be discussed, however, that did NOT 
delay the occupancy date by Silver Baron and thus the damages 
resulting from that breach of contract to perform proper work are 
in issue. 
27. Daedalus did not obtain what it wanted, and did not get 
written notice of such change. Daedalus wants it removed and a 
better system installed. 
28. Another problem that developed after rentals began in 
late December 2004 was not Shamrock's doing, but the water 
heaters would randomly kick on and off, there would be no hot 
water at times and at times there would be and the guests were at 
the mercy of the water heaters. That turned out to be, after 
much investigation during the same time period and by a 
-21-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
determination of the manufacturer of the water heaters, A.O. 
Smith, to be a problem in the circuit board of those heaters. 
Those circuit boards were in fact recalled and new ones installed 
by A.O. Smith and they then functioned. That is NOT attributable 
to Shamrock as those heaters were the ones specified by the 
architect and engineer. 
29. Instead of the Bryant boiler and associated system a 
Rite boiler was substituted at a slightly less overall cost, but 
increased venting expense, but Shamrock has not bill for that 
greater cost. 
30. Daedalus was not aware of that change until sometime in 
October 2004. 
31. Shamrock billed Daedalus $1,309,512 but that was in 
error due to a mistaken double billing in the sum of $18,342. 
Thus the correct billing should have been $1,291,170. Daedalus 
claims Shamrock has billed more, $1,305,638. Shamrock claims 
that Daedalus owes it $256,787. As pure math, Daedalus does not 
contest that figure but asserts of course breaches by Shamrock 
and damages owing to Daedalus offset that amount. 
30. Shamrock still owes its subcontractors a total of 
$112,686, which is part of the claimed $256,786 Shamrock claims 
it is owed by Daedalus. One of those subs of Shamrock is Stewart 
Heating. That entity is operated by a friend of Padan, and 
because of the dispute Stewart was not paid. As a small 
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contractor Stewart was struggling and Daedalus determined to 
"pay" Stewart directly and issued on its books a $50,000 loan to 
Stewart, to be repaid if and when Shamrock paid Stewart. In fact 
Shamrock owes Stewart the sum of $46,871. 
31. On April 26, 2005, Daedalus sent a letter to Shamrock 
asking, among other things, that the defective equipment be 
replaced. 
32. Silver Baron asserts that because there was no transfer 
by the date set, it shared in the rents with Premier, resulting 
in damages of over $678,000, the difference between what the 
fixed rent (base monthly rental) would have been and the variable 
rate (on a 60-40 split in favor of Silver Baron over Premier). 
33. Daedalus felt strongly about subcontract provisions and 
having the specified boiler. 
34. At first Silver Baron attempted to sell fractional 
shares of these units as a residence club but then opted to begin 
selling the units outright in mid-2005. They were all sold by 
sometime in 2006, though the evidence was not convincing as to 
when that was, and most were sold in 2005. Silver Baron did not 
provide evidence of its profit from those sales. Silver Baron 
promised to provide tax return information to Shamrock at Padan' s 
deposition and failed to do so after three formal discovery 
requests, blaming their change in lawyers for that oversight. No. 
such documents were produced nor shown to the court. The court 
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finds Silver Baron, for some reason, failed to provide that 
legitimate discovery consisting of their tax return information 
which would have shown any profit made on these sales. Daedalus 
also failed to provide, until recently, their claimed damage 
calculations. Silver Baron's evidence on its damages is too 
speculative to amount to convincing evidence, sufficient to award 
such delay damages even under the contract. 
35. Neither Daedalus nor Silver Baron had a performance 
bond. 
36. Daedalus claims it paid, under their prime contract, 
$400,000 to Silver Baron when Silver Baron was dissolved. 
Daedalus was unable to make the loan required by the prime 
contract and nothing happened until Silver Baron was dissolved, 
then Silver Baron was credited the sum of $400,000, but it is not 
clear to the court just when that happened. Padan was and is the 
principle in both Daedalus and Silver Baron. 
37. Shamrock filed a post-trial motion to admit exhibits 21, 
22 and 27, urging Shamrock mistakenly believed they had been 
admitted as they were discussed at trial. The court will admit 
those exhibits and has considered them in this decision. 
Based on the above findings and discussion, the court makes 
the following: 
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CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. Shamrock did the work and has not been paid. Daedalus 
has breached the contract by failing to pay $256,786 and owes 
Shamrock that amount, less whatever the cost of replacing the 
current system as discussed below. 
2. Shamrock breached the contract by failing to provide 
written notice of its knowledge that there was a design 
deficiency and of Shamrock's intent to substitute equipment. The 
court concludes that under this negotiated contract that was a 
most material breach. 
3. Shamrock installed the other boiler without notice. The 
court concludes that it was not equivalent because it was not 
what Daedalus wanted and its upkeep and maintenance and operation 
involve a system Daedalus specifically did not want. Shamrock 
also failed to properly install the mixer valve which caused the 
over heating in the units until that was remedied in February 
2005. 
4. Daedalus failed to give written notice and did not 
declare the contract null and void for failure to timely complete 
the work. 
4, Shamrock caused some delay but did not delay the date 
that Daedalus could turn over the project to Silver Baron such 
that Shamrock is responsible for any delay damages. Not only is 
Shamrock not responsible for any rental losses alleged by Silver 
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Baron, Shamrock is not responsible for the claimed $400,000 
Daedalus allegedly lost to Silver Baron. Moreover, under the 
Daedalus-Silver Baron prime contract, if there was a delay by 
Daedalus in turning the project to Silver Baron, the rental 
provisions were merely extended by one year and there are and can 
be no delay damages attributable to Shamrock for rental loss. 
Even if Shamrock did cause some delay, whatever rentals Silver 
Baron lost are not the responsibility of Shamrock entirely and 
the evidence is not such that the court can find any particular 
portion or percentage of fault by Shamrock in delay of the 
overall project. 
5. Daedalus is entitled to what it bargained for, a system 
of its choosing and not of the choosing of Shamrock. Shamrock is 
responsible for either the replacement of the boiler and allied 
venting system or to pay Daedalus the cost of having another 
subcontractor do such work and provide such equipment. 
6. Under the Sub-contract Shamrock does not appear to the 
court to be entitled to attorney fees against Daedalus. The 
paragraph 17 provision relied on by Shamrock refers to contractor 
being able to recover fees under certain circumstances but it 
does not provide that the subcontractor can recover attorney fees 
as best the court can discern. 
7. Because Silver Baron did not obtain a bond, under UCA 14-
2-2, as the owner Silver Baron is liable for the reasonable 
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damages as above concluded. Shamrock is entitled under that 
statute as the prevailing party overall to its attorney fees to 
be taxed as costs in the action. 
8. Shamrock is entitled to pre-judgment interest, but not on 
the amount it owed Stewart, since April 2005. 
9. Shamrock is not entitled to the amount paid (loaned) by 
Daedalus to Stewart, $46,871. Thus, the amount owing by 
Daedalus to Shamrock is $256,786 minus the amount owed to Stewart 
which Daedalus has paid, $46,781, and minus the cost of 
replacement of the system installed defectively and not bargained 
for by Daedalus. 
Shamrock is to prepare an order and judgment in compliance 
with URCP, Rule 7(f) setting forth this ruling. THIS MEMORANDUM 
DECISION IS INCORPORATED INTO THE FINAL JUDGMENT AND ORDER. 
Plaintiff should provide, in the proposed order, a provision 
awarding attorney fees in the amount of $ . A rule 73 
affidavit should be filed, and that can be objected to as to 
necessity and reasonableness and any other basis in law and the 
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court will then fill in the amount the court determines should be 
awarded to Shamrock against Silver Baron. 
DATED this ^fday of / f p4U{ r 2010, 
BRUCE C. LUBECK 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
"*VRrCTS* 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF T j i ' W I f ' W l H E DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SUMMIT COp$$N|§T$F$; $& UTAH 




SHAMROCK PLUMBING, LLC, et.al., 
Defendant. 
SHAMROCK PLUMBING LLC, 
Cross claim plaintiff, 
vs. 
SILVER BARON PARTNERS, LC; 
DAEDALUS USA INC.; FRED W. 
FAIRCLOUGH; and CHRISTINE 
FAIRCLOUGH, 
Cross claim defendants. 
SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM 
DECISION 
Case1 $!' '0^ 050 04 53 
k AKH'.V 
Judge BRUCE C. LUBECK 
DATE: J u n e 1 5 , 2.010 
"t v ^ W ? -V.\)'i' 
R WM V 
ii^i V 
The above matter came before the court for a supplemental 
evidentiary hearing and argument on June 11-j 2010, in the West 
Jordan Department of the court.. :-. /., 
Third party plaintiff (hereinafter plaintiff)Shamrock was 
present through Mel S. Martin and cross claim defendants Daedalus 
and Silver Baron (hereinafter defendants') were present through 
Joseph M. Chambers and Josh Chambers. 
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BACKGROUND 
The above matter came before the court for a bench trial on 
January 20, 21, and 22, 2010. The court issued a 28 page 
memorandum decision on January 29, 2010. 
On February 5, 2010, plaintiff filed an affidavit seeking 
attorney fees. Defendants filed a counter declaration on 
February 19, 2010 
Thereafter on February 19, 2010, defendants filed an 
objection to a proposed judgment provided by plaintiff and a 
request to clarify the court's ruling. Defendant also urged it 
was the prevailing party and should be awarded attorney fees. 
Plaintiff filed a response on March 2, 2010, and also asked for 
clarification of the court's ruling. Defendants filed a combined 
reply and opposition on March 23, 2010. 
Oral argument was held April 6, 2010 and the court issued a 
Minute Entry on April 15, 2010, scheduling a further evidentiary 
hearing in the West Jordan Department due to the re-assignment of 
the undersigned judge. That hearing was held, together with 
further oral argument, and the court took the issues under 
advisement. 
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The court finds supplemental facts as follows: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. The system that was eventually installed in Building F by 
Shamrock remains to this date in Building F and is functioning. 
Daedalus continues to contend, however, that it did not get the 
system it desired. The court so found in its January 29, 2010 
memorandum decision. 
2. Later Building G was constructed by Daedalus, using other 
tradesmen rather than Shamrock. That building is basically the 
same as Building F in its design and function and purpose. The 
mechanical engineer who designed that Building G heating system 
testified at this hearing and the hot water system in Building G 
is tied into the system of Building F. That was done in 2007, 
well after the Building F issues of 2004-05. 
3. That expert, Peterson, opined in common with Shamrock in 
2004 that the specification's as called for were not permitted by 
the International Fuel Gas Code in that a natural draft appliance 
could not be connected into a system operating with a positive 
pressure system. 
4. The specifications were not followed and in place is the 
Rite boiler with a negative pressure, or natural draft at the 
vent connector and two A.O. Smith water heaters which were as 
specified. 
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5, This expert opined that there were two options to 
eliminate the induced draft fan. In essence the two options were 
to replace the Rite boiler or the two water heaters. In the 
first, Option 1, there would need to be a new boiler which he 
estimated would cost $45,900 and new flues for the water heaters 
which would cost $16,500. 
6. Defendant's project supervisor, Roy Bartee, opined that 
to do such work in what is called Option 1 would not cost $54,200 
($35,900+$16,500) but would cost approximately $133,000 because 
of the need for a good deal of other structural changes involving 
walls and roofs and other trades such as electricians, drywall, 
painting, and other sub contractors together with permit costs. 
Based on the above findings and discussion, and the previous 
findings and discussion and conclusions of law, the court makes 
the following: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. To the extent the findings are conclusions of law and 
that these conclusions of law contain findings of fact, each is 
to be treated as a finding or conclusion as appropriate. 
2. Shamrock did the work and has not been paid. Daedalus 
has breached the contract by failing to pay $209,915. However, 
because Shamrock did not install the system Daedalus wanted, and 
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indeed Shamrock could not do so and comply with applicable codes, 
Shamrock is to install the proper "fix" and remediate the system 
as Peterson outlines in his Option 1, by re-installing the proper 
boiler and new flue system. The court finds and concludes that . 
in fact that can be done for an amount less than Daedalus claims 
but more than Shamrock claims. The court is somewhat unguided 
here but notes that Peterson is a licensed mechanical engineer 
but his figures were in his words an "estimate" or even a 
"guestimate" and were not a bid. Bartee, a man of great 
expertise and experience, has considered factors the court 
believes Peterson has also included. Thus, the court will find 
and conclude, as best it can, that the true cost of this "fix is 
$80,000 and that amount of judgment is to be reduced by that 
latter figure. 
2. Shamrock breached the contract by failing to provide 
written notice of its knowledge that there was a design 
deficiency and of Shamrock's intent to substitute equipment. 
However, even considering the first breach rule, the court finds 
that the breach by Shamrock was not one that resulted in 
Daedalus' right to fail to pay. Even though the contract has 
many provisions allowing Daedalus to withhold payment for various 
reasons, the promise of Shamrock to give written notice is not a 
dependent or reciprocal obligation tied to payment. The court 
has found that notice was given by Shamrock, but not written 
-5-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
notice. Daedalus in letters asked Shamrock to change the system 
and Shamrock did not do so, but this order of the court, reducing 
the damages for non-payment by the amount of the re-installation 
of the "new" system amounts to the only damages suffered by 
Daedalus. 
3. As found previously, Daedalus did not give written notice 
of termination of the contract nor declare it null and void. 
4. The court indicated that Shamrock was entitled to 
attorney fees not under the sub-contract but under the bonding 
statute. Shamrock is entitled under that bonding statute as the 
prevailing party overall to its attorney fees to be taxed as 
costs in the action. 
5. The court now, however, agrees with defendants that the 
entirety of the claim for fees by Shamrock is not justified. 
Shamrock did not prevail on its lien foreclosure claim and did 
not prevail on some of the issues for which it seeks attorney 
fees, such as the default judgment being set aside and the 
summary judgment motion. The affidavit of Shamrock does not 
properly differentiate some of those claims, successful and 
unsuccessful. However, using the flexible and reasoned approach, 
Daedalus did not prevail on its claim for delay damages either. 
The court believes Shamrock is entitled under the bonding statute 
to attorney fees. The court cannot second guess an affidavit 
that a particular task ought to take a certain amount of time, 
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for example, 1.2 hours rather than 3 hours, nor that costs should 
have been X rather than Y because of the cost, for example, of 
trial binders or postage or mileage. As best the court can 
calculate, carefully going over the affidavits of counsel, the 
court believes that using the flexible and reasoned approach and 
parsing out the tasks that were clearly not successful for 
Shamrock, Shamrock is entitled to costs in the sum of $4400 and 
attorney fees in the sum of $45,000. The court full well 
realizes those are rounded figures but again the court believes 
Shamrock prevailed overall, but not on some claims, and the court 
cannot figure on an hour-to-hour basis any closer than that sum. 
Thus, Shamrock is entitled to attorney fees and costs as found 
and concluded herein. . 
5. As to pre-judgment interest, the court again believes • 
that Shamrock is correct, that Shamrock did not have the use of 
this sum owed and again the pure math figures were not really 
disputed. Even though this complex case shows the difficulty 
between sub-contractors and contractors, the court believes the 
sum known and certain, minus the re-installation work, is 
justified. Interest is to be calculated on the $209,915 figure 
from April 2005 to this date. Even though the amount due is now 
reduced by the cost of re-installation, the court believes the 
sum was certain and fixed and known. In fact and in deed, the 
system is still working and' being used by the owners after more 
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than five years. It is not the system desired and bargained for, 
however, but under the law the court believes the sum certain was 
calculable, now minus the re-installation costs, from April 2005. 
Shamrock is to prepare an order and judgment in compliance 
with URCP, Rule 7(f) setting forth this supplemental ruling 
showing the judgment against Daedalus for the breach claim and 
Silver Baron for the bonding claim. THIS SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM 
DECISION and the January 29, 2010, MEMORANDUM DECISION ARE 
INCORPORATED INTO THE FINAL JUDGMENT AND ORDER. 
DATED this if. day of i^SHSSSS^. 
BRUCE C. LUBECK "%;:., ., 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE*^" 
-8-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
CERTIFICATE OF NOTIFICATION 
I certify that a copy of the attached document was sent to the 
following people for case 050500453 by the method and on the date 
specified. 
JOSEPH M CHAMBERS 31 FEDERAL AVE LOGAN, UT 84321 
JOSH M CHAMBERS 31 FEDERAL AVE LOGAN UT 84321 





MAIL: LEWIS M FRANCIS 170 S MAIN ST STE 1500 SALT LAKE CITY UT 
84101-1644 
MAIL: MELVIN S MARTIN 5286 S COMMERCE DR STE A-136 MURRAY UT 
84107 
MAIL: . HAROLD C VERHAAREN 5217 S STATE ST 4TH FLR SALTt£AKE^ITY 
UT 84107 / • , . • : — ,
 ; \ 
Date.CUl fft,7ttfo ^r)J(YM^J> VM 
V ' * ' * "•» ' ' •••'•'.'V 
Deputy Cour t C l e W ,>V, .;.. - .•.,:•- # 
V >)) **:,.} :/)\^\ • '.-\„.' 
•••*>. ' • • • • •<• • " • - • • > . 
Hk T.-' if 
\ v ,^-
Vage 1 ( las t ) Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Appendix B-1 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Job Name: Lodges at Deer Valley 
building F 
Job No.: i422 
Phase Code: 15-011 
Contract No.: 1422-08 
SUBCONTRACT AGREEMENT 
Contractor: /^X?C C^TT^J^ 
Daedalus USA, Inc. '—'v ', / / 
1850 Sidewinder Drive, Suite 320 £/ 7/0 / 
P.O. Box 1937 / / 
Park City, Utah 84060 
(801) 647-0065 /4fr/t tf 6 ~ &fr 2cT 
(801) 658-1159 Fax
 / 5 ^ ^ ^ 
Subcontractor: ft *** *>«*«™7 
mmim:^^^m> « t*o **»* ** ww 
340 West 500 North / * s * "** <tr™>'<*4 
North Salt Lake, Utah 84054 
(801)295-1690 * # / / * > o r / 3 £ , * * D 
(801) 295-1699 Fax /ZOfi/goo - /%otao& 
AGREEMENT: 
This Subcontract Agreement is entered this 20th day of May, 2004 by and between DAEDALUS USA, 
INC. ("Contractor") and Shamrock Plumbing, LLC, ("Subcontractor") for subcontract work to be performed on 
the designated portion of the following project in Park City, Utah (the "Project'): 
Project Description: 
The Lodges at Deer Valley - Building F 
4 Story 24 unit.condominium building with below grade parking structure 
Approximately 84,024 square feet 
For the purposes of this Agreement, the following Definitions shall apply: 
General Contract: the agreement between Owner and Contractor. 
Work: All work required to be performed by Contractor pursuant to the terms of the General 
Contract, including Subcontract Work. 
Site; The real property on which the Work is to be performed, as more particularly described 
in the Contract Documents. 
Subcontract Work: All work required to be performed by Subcontractor pursuant to the terms of this 
Subcontract. 
Contract Schedule: Contractor's schedule for performance of the Work. 
Subcontract Price: The price Contractor agrees to pay Subcontractor for performance by Subcontractor of 
the Subcontract Work. 
Working Day: For purposes of this Subcontract, working day shall mean Monday through Friday, except 
holidays. 
For good and valuable consideration, Contractor and Subcontractor agree as follows: 
DAE 
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Job Name: Lodges at Deer Valley 
Building F 
Job No.: 1422 
Phase Code: 15-011 
Contract No.: 1422-08 
1. THE WORK: The work of Subcontractor under this Subcontract Agreement (the "Subcontract Work1') 
shall include the HVAC and Plumbing work as described In the Contract Documents per EXHIBIT "A", 
including all labor, material, equipment, services and other items required to complete such portion of the 
Work and in accordance with the following clarifications: 
1.1. All Subcontract Work shall comply with all applicable local, state and national codes and follow 
the Installation procedures outlined In the ICBO approval for any product used. 
1.2. The following items are specifically included in this contract: 
SEE EXHIBIT "B" 
1.3. The following items are specifically excluded from this contract: 
SEE EXHIBIT'S" 
2. SUBCONTRACT AMOUNT: The amount to be paid to Subcontractor for the Subcontract Work (the 
"Subcontract Amount") shall be _One Million One Hundred Nineteen Thousand Eight Three Dollars 
($1.119.063) and shall include ail costs of the Subcontract Work including tax, freight and other charges. 
2.1. Unit prices, if any, are as follows: 
SEE EXHIBIT'S" 
2.2. Alternates, if any, are as follows: 
SEE EXHIBITS 
3. REVIEW OF CONTRACT DOCUMENTS AND PROJECT SITE; Subcontractor acknowledges that prior 
to Its execution of this Subcontract Agreement: (i) it has reviewed and examined all of the construction 
plans, drawings, models, specifications, measurements, schedules and addenda for the Project that it 
deems relevant to the performance of the Subcontract Work (collectively, the "Contract Documents"), (ii) 
it has examined, inspected and investigated the location and condition of the Site on which the 
Subcontract Work is to be performed (the "Site"), (Hi) it knows the conditions under which the Subcontract 
Work is to be performed, (iv) it has determined that the Contract Documents are sufficient to enable 
Subcontractor to determine the Subcontract Amount for completion of its Subcontract Work; and (v) it has 
examined and approves of all lines, grade, elevations, and its price reflects all work necessary and 
incidental to provide a complete project. Subcontractor Is entering into this Subcontract Agreement on 
the basis of Subcontractor's own examination, Inspection, review, and investigation of the Contract 
Documents and the Site, and is not relying on the opinion or representations of Contractor. No allowance 
in the form of any additional compensation, including, without limitation, any adjustment to the Subcontract 
Amount, is to be made by reason of any error of the Subcontractor in it's review, inspection and 
interpretation of the Construction Documents or the Site. Subcontractor shall assure and guarantee that 
all of its own subcontractors are subject to all terms of this Subcontract Agreement. 
4. PROGRESS PAYMENTS: Contractor shall pay Subcontractor the Subcontract Price and other amounts 
that may come due to Subcontractor under this Subcontract on a percentage of completion basis, as 
determined by Contractor and, if Owner has reserved a right to so determine, by Owner (or Architect or 
other designee of Owner), when and as Contractor receives payment in unrestricted funds from Owner, 
for the Subcontract Work completed by Subcontractor; provided, however, that (a) Contractor may retain 
as security for Subcontractor's fulfillment of its obligations under this Subcontract an amount equal to 
five(5%) percent of Subcontractor's gross billings, or such other amount as is set forth in this Subcontract 
Agreement, (b) payments by Contractor to Subcontractor are to be made exclusively from funds paid by 
DAE 
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Job Name: Lodges at Deer Valley 
lullding F 
Job No.: 422 
Phase Code: 15-011 
Contract No.: 1422-08 
Owner to Contractor as unrestricted funds for the Subcontract Work performed by Subcontractor, and 
(c) Contractor's obligation to make payments to Subcontractor is based solely on Contractor's receipt of 
payment of unrestricted funds from Owner. Subcontractor specif ically assumes the risk of nonpayment 
should Owner fail to pay Contractor. As long as Subcontractor is in compliance with this Subcontract, 
Contractor shall pay Subcontractor each progress payment within ten working days after receipt by 
Contractor of Contractor's payment from Owner. 
Contractor may withhold monthly progress payments, in whole or in part, in order to protect Contractor 
and/or Owner from loss from: 
4.1 Defective work not remedied, material not furnished, clean-up not performed or any other non-
complying aspects of the Subcontract Work; 
4.2 Claims, levies, attachments, stop notices or court orders filed or which Contractor has reasonable 
cause to believe are likely to be filed against Subcontractor, including claims covered by insurance 
until such claims are accepted by insurance carrier; 
4.3 Failure of Subcontractor to make timely and proper payments for materials, equipment, 
transportation or shipping costs, taxes, fees or payments to its subcontractors for labor (including 
fringe benefits owed and payments due under collective bargaining agreements), or any other claims 
of any nature growing out of the Subcontract Work; 
4.4 Reasonable indication that the Subcontract Work will not be completed for the remaining unpaid 
balance of the Subcontract Price or in compliance with the Contract Schedule; 
4.5 Unsatisfactory prosecution of the Subcontract Work by Subcontractor; 
4.6 Failure to deliver to Contractor requested releases, lien waivers, supplier affidavit forms, insurance 
certificates, "as built" drawings, written guarantees or warranties or the approvals of the Subcontract 
Work required by any authority having jurisdiction; 
4.7 Damage to any portion of the Work, another contractor or subcontractor, Owner and/or Contractor; 
4.8 Filing by or against Subcontractor of a petition for bankruptcy or reorganization; 
4.9 Any claim or potential claim under any law related to the protection of human health or the 
environment, including without limitation any claim related to a release by Subcontractor of a 
hazardous substance, hazardous waste, or other pollutant or contaminant on the Site; 
4.10 Any other conditions of any nature which may arise from Subcontractors action or failure to act 
which, in Contractor's reasonable opinion, will result in loss to Owner and/or Contractor. 
When the grounds set forth in subparagraphs 4.1 through 4.10 are removed by Subcontractor to the 
satisfaction of Contractor, payment of the amounts so withheld will be made by Contractor pursuant to 
the procedures set forth in paragraph 4 above. However, as a condition to resuming such payments, 
Contractor may require that Subcontractor furnish releases In a form satisfactory to Contractor for all 
claims made under subparagraphs 4.1 through 4.10 and/or supporting Invoices, receipts or other records 
satisfactory to Contractor to substantiate the amounts owed or paid. 
5. FINAL PAYMENT: The balance of the Subcontract Price and any other amounts owed to Subcontractor 
under the terms of this Subcontract shall be due and payable when all of the following have occurred: (a) 
completion and acceptance of the Work by Owner; (b) within ten days following receipt by Contractor 
from Owner of the entire amount, Including any and all retention due Contractor from Owner; (c) removal 
of any grounds for withholding payments under paragraph 4 above; (d) receipt by Contractor of 
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satisfactory proof that all claims, including taxes, arising out of the Subcontract Work (and any liens 
related thereto) have been released; and, (e) receipt by Contractor of satisfactory proof that all labor, 
including fringe benefits owed and payments due under collective bargaining agreements, and ail 
Subcontractor's material suppliers have been paid and are waiving their lien rights upon the final payment 
of the balance due. If minor items remain to be completed by Subcontractor, Contractor may retain a 
sum equal to two hundred (200%) percent of Contractor's estimated cost to complete any unfinished 
items. 
INVOICE PROCESSING: The billing cut-off for this project is the 25th day of each month. Invoices 
received by the 25th day of the month will be paid on the 25th day of the following month contingent upon 
Contractor's receipt of a properly prepared application for payment. Any applications for payment received 
sixty (60) days or more after work has been completed shall not be honored. All applications for payment 
must be submitted to Contractor's office. In order for any application for payment to be "properly 
prepared," all of the following must be true with respect to each application for payment: 
6:1 The Subcontract Work billed Is complete In the opinion of Contractor at the time of receipt of the 
application; 
6.2 Subcontractor's insurance policies are In full force and effect; 
6.3 All prices must agree with the contract amount and progress payment schedule of values; 
6.4 The application shall include appropriate lien releases and waiver of claims arising out of 
Subcontractor's performance of the Subcontract Work on the forms provided by Contractor; 
6.6 Contractor has the right, but not the obligation, to make any payment due to Subcontractor hereunder 
by joint check to Subcontractor and Its sub-subcontractors, material suppliers, or employees which 
have performed work or furnished materials under this Subcontract, irrespective of whether lien 
releases have been submitted. 
DATE OF COMMENCEMENT AND SUBSf ANTIAL COMPLETION: The date of commencement of the 
Subcontract Work shall be April 26,2004, unless the Contractor issues a notice to proceed of a different 
date. Contractor shall substantially complete the Subcontract Work not later than September 20,2004, 
—. calendar days aftor the Subcontract date of commoncoment, subject to adjustments to this 
Subcontract Agreement. The date of substantial completion shall thorofore be ? 
TIME: Time is of essence for this Subcontract. Subcontractor agrees to diligently perform the 
Subcontract Work in accordance with the Contract Schedule. Without limiting the generality of the 
foregoing, Subcontractor shall perform the Subcontract Work in accordance with the Contract Documents 
at such a rate and in such a manner as not to delay the Work, the Contract Schedule, or final completion 
of the project. Subcontractor shall begin the Subcontract Work within five working days after receipt of 
written notice to proceed from the Contractor and thereafter perform the Subcontract Work continuously 
and expeditiously in accordance with the requirements of this Subcontract as determined by Contractor. 
SCHEDULE: During the progress of the Work, Contractor shall have the right to revise the Contract 
Schedule to accommodate changes in conditions affecting the Work if deemed by Contractor to be 
necessary or convenient to the overall progress of the Work. Subcontractor shall adjust its operations 
to conform to all Contract Schedule changes and shall make no claim for acceleration or delay by reason 
of the schedule revisions as long as the revisions are reasonable, taking into account the scope and 
complexity of the Work. Contractor shall have complete control of the Site and shall have the right to 
decide the time and order in which the various portions of the Subcontract Work shall be performed. If 
the Subcontract Work is divided into parts, Subcontractor will perform several or all parts simultaneously 
if required by Contractor. Subcontractor shall have no claim for damages against Contractor for delay, 
hindrances, obstructions to Its work, or other such events no matter how or by whom caused. In case of 
/?-
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such delays, hindrances, or obstructions not due in any part to Subcontractor fault, Subcontractor shall. 
be entitled only to such extension of time or performance as may be allowed by Contractor provided that 
Subcontractor has given all written request notices and can substantiate the delay in a form and 
substance to the satisfaction of the Owner and Contractor. 
10. SUBCONTRACT CHANGE ORDERS: In the event Subcontractor finds any design deficiency, error in 
measurements, or errors In the Contract Documents or conditions which Subcontractor believes to be at 
variance with approved plans, Subcontractor shall have an absolute duty to immediately provide written 
notice thereof to Contractor. Contractor shall have the right at any time to make changes to drawings and 
in the Subcontract Work. If any changes cause a material increase or decrease in the amount of work, 
Subcontractor agrees to accept any such changes subject to this paragraph and to proceed without delay 
to perform the Subcontract Work as changed. Prior to the commencement of any such material changes 
in the Subcontract Work, Subcontractor shall submit a written claim for any required adjustment to the 
Contract Amount with a breakdown, supporting invoices and/or quotes. If Contractor and Subcontractor 
cannot agree on the amount of the addition or deletion, the dispute for adjustment shall be submitted to 
binding arbitration In Summit County, Utah, and Subcontractor shall nevertheless.and unconditionally 
proceed with the material changes, if directed by Contractor during the pendency of arbitration. If 
Subcontractor makes such change or any other changes to the Subcontract Work without written direction 
from Contractor, such change constitutes an agreement by Subcontractor that it will not be paid for that 
changed work and Subcontractor shall be liable for any and all losses, costs, expenses, damages, and 
liability of any nature whatsoever associated with or in any way arising out of any such change made 
without written direction from Contractor. 
11. MATERIALS, INSPECTION, TESTING AND CLEAN-UP: Subcontractor warrants that all materials used 
in the Subcontract Work shall be new, free from defects, and be in quantities sufficient to facilitate the 
expeditious execution of the Subcontract Work. Subcontractor shall, upon request, furnish for approval 
full Information and/or samples concerning the materials. Machinery, equipment, materials, and articles 
installed or used without approval shall be used at the risk of subsequent rejection by Contractor. All 
material and workmanship shall be subject to inspection, examination, and testing, at any and all times 
during manufacture and/or construction. Contractor shall have the right to reject improper or defective 
material or workmanship or require correction without charge to Contractor. Subcontractor shall promptly 
segregate and remove rejected material and its construction debris daily from the Site. In addition, 
Subcontractor shall at all times keep the premises and surrounding area free from accumulation of waste 
materials, rubbish, or unclean conditions. 
12. CONSTRUCTION MEETINGS: Subcontractor will attend construction progress meetings as directed by" 
the Contractor. 
13. WARRANTY: If the General Contract requires Contractor to warranty or guarantee materials or 
workmanship, Subcontractor hereby warrants and guarantees the Subcontract Work for the same period 
and to the same extent. This warranty shall run to Contractor and the Owner and their successors and 
assigns. In addition to and without limiting the.scope of the warranties herein provided, Subcontractor 
warranties the Subcontract Work as follows: 
13.1 Any design .work required to be performed by Subcontractor as part of the Subcontract Work shall 
be performed (a) by duly licensed and certified architects and engineers, (b) with due diligence and 
to a professional standard of competence, quality and technical accuracy, and (c) in strict 
conformity with all requirements of this Subcontract. 
13.2 All materials and equipment furnished pursuant to this Subcontract will be new unless otherwise 
specified by Contractor, and shall comply strictly with any applicable environmental requirements. 
13.3 Ail Subcontract Work will be thorough, first class, sound, workmanlike and of substantial quality; 
constructed by qualified, careful and efficient workers; and free from defects in design, workmanship 
• * * -
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and materials, and will conform to all provisions of this Subcontract. 
13.4 The warranties and guarantees provided In subparagraphs 13.1 through 13.3 shall apply to all 
defective or non-conforming Subcontract Work that appears within one year following the 
completion and acceptance of the Subcontract Work, or for the period for which Contractor fs 
obligated to Owner to correct such defective or non-conforming Work, whichever is longer; 
provided, however, that if such defective or non-conforming Work is latent; i.e., not reasonably 
ascertainable prior to or within one year following completion of and acceptance of the Subcontract 
Work, then such warranty shall apply to each latent defective or non-conforming Work that appears 
for a period of time equal to the statute of limitation period applicable to such latent defective or non-
conforming Work, or for the period for which the Contractor Is obligated to Owner to correct said 
latent defective or non-conforming Work, whichever is longer. 
The obligations of the Subcontractor under subparagraphs 13.1 through 13.4 shall Include* the correction 
of the defective or non-conforming Subcontract Work, the removal and replacement of other portions of 
the Work that are necessary to be removed to gain access to the Subcontract Work to be corrected, the 
repair or replacement of any damage caused by said defective or non-conforming Subcontract Work, and 
all consequential damages suffered by Contractor or Owner as a result of said defective or non-
conforming Subcontract Work or the failure of Subcontractor to promptly and properly correct same. 
Subcontractor shall promptly remove from the Site all defective or non-conforming materials, which 
Contractor requires to be replaced, at Subcontractor's sole expense. If Subcontractor fails to promptly 
correct any defect or non-conformity as directed by Contractor, Contractor may correct the defect or non-
conformity and charge its cost to correct to Subcontractor in accordance with paragraph 19 below. 
The provisions of the warranties provided in paragraph 13, together with any applicable warranties and 
guarantees of Subcontractor's subcontractors and suppliers, shall survive inspection, approval, testing 
and acceptance of and payment for the Subcontract Work and shall run to and inure to the benefit of 
Contractor and Owner and their successors and assigns. 
14. ASSIGNMENTS AND SUBCONTRACTING: No part of this Subcontract may be assigned or 
subcontracted without the prior written approval of Contractor. 
15. DEFAULT, SUBCONTRACT TERMINATION: if Subcontractor, in the opinion of Contractor, at any time 
(i) fails to supply supervision, properly skilled workers and proper materials; (ii) fails to properly and 
diligently prosecute the Subcontract Work in a timely manner according to the schedule as established 
or modified from time to time by Contractor; (iii) fails to provide an action plan suitable to Contractor for 
correction of any deficiency when so requested by Contractor; (iv) falls to make prompt payment of its 
workers, subcontractors, materialmen, laborers, or suppliers; (v) fails to provide adequate quantities of 
labor or materials to meet schedules; (vi) fails to attend construction progress meetings as directed by 
Contractor; (vii) either loses its license or fails to renew its license; or (viii) otherwise fails to perform any 
term, covenant or condition contained in this Subcontract, including but not limited to clean-up; Contractor, 
without any prejudice to any rights or remedies, and without terminating this Subcontract shall have the 
right, In its sole discretion, upon a two working day written notice to Subcontractor, to declare this 
Subcontract null and void, and to exercise any or all of the following remedies: 
' 15.1 Assess delay penalties against Subcontractor In the amount $1,500.00 per calendar day for 
each day that the Subcontract Work remains incomplete; 
15.2 Supply such of its own workers and quantity of materials, equipment, and other facilities as 
Contractor deems necessary for the orderly progress of or completion of the Subcontract Work or 
any part thereof which Subcontractor has failed to complete or perform, and charge the costs to 
Subcontractor, including overhead at 20% profit, together with attorney's fees incurred as a result 
of Subcontractor's failure of performance; 
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15.3 Contract with other subcontractors to perform such part of the Subcontract Work as Contractor shall 
determine will provide the most expeditious completion thereof, and charge the cost to 
Subcontractor, including costs which exceed the unpaid Contract Amount; 
15.4 Withhold payment of any monies due Subcontractor pending corrective action to the extent required 
by and to the satisfaction of Contractor; 
15.5 Use any materials, implements, equipment, appliances, or tools furnished by or belonging to 
Subcontractor to complete the Subcontract Work without any further compensation to 
Subcontractor; 
15.6 File legal action for damages, including consequential damages and loss of profits. Subcontractor 
shall also be liable for all losses, costs, expenses, liabilities, and damages including consequential • 
damages and liquidated damages, sustained by Contractor, or for which Contractor may be liable 
to third parties because of Subcontractor's default, delay or negligence. 
In the event of any emergency affecting the safety of persons or property, Contractor may proceed as 
described above without notice. 
16. TERMINATION OR MODIFICATION FOR CONVENIENCE. Contractor may, at anytime with afive (5) 
working day written notice, terminate or modify Subcontractor's services and the Subcontract Work at 
Contractor's sole convenience. Upon receipt of such notice, Subcontractor shall, unless the notice directs 
otherwise, immediately discontinue or modify the Subcontract Work and placing of orders for materials, 
facilities and supplies In connection with the performance of this Subcontract and shall, If requested, make 
every reasonable effort to procure cancellation or modification of all existing orders or contracts upon 
terms satisfactory to Contractor, or at the option of Contractor, give Contractor the right to assume those 
obligations directly, including all benefits to be derived therefrom. Subcontractor shall only be entitled to 
payment of the actual portion of the Subcontract Work completed in conformity with this Subcontract, as 
of the date of termination. There shall be deducted from such sums the amount of any payments made 
to Subcontractor prior to the date of termination or modification and all applicable back charges. No other 
claim shall be made as compensation for compensatory or consequential damages, Subcontractor shall 
not be entitled to any claim or claim of lien against Contractor or any other person or entity for any 
additional compensation or damages in the event of such termination or modification and payment. 
17. WITHHOLDING PAYMENT. Contractor may withhold all or part of any payment to the extent necessary 
to protect Contractor from loss, including costs and attorney's fees, on account of (i) defective Subcontract 
Work not remedied; (ii) claims filed or reasonable evidence indicating probable filing of claim; (Hi) failure 
of Subcontractor to make payments promptly to its subcontractors or for material, or labor; (iv) reasonable 
doubt that this Subcontract can be completed for the balance then unpaid; (v) damage to other 
subcontractors; (vi) penalties assessed against Contractor or Subcontractor for failure of Subcontractor 
to comply with laws; or (vii) any other ground for withholding payment allowed by law or as otherwise 
provided in this Subcontract Agreement including but not limited to attorney's fees Incurred by Contractor 
to enforce this Subcontract or remedy Subcontractor's default. When the above matters are rectified, 
such amounts as then due and owing shall be paid or credited to Subcontractor. 
18. PROTECTION OF WORK AND SECURITY: Subcontractor shall take all necessary precautions to protect 
the Project, all construction work, materials, employees, equipment and the work of other trades from • 
theft, vandalism, collapse, wind and other damage. In the event that Subcontractor, or any of it's 
employees, subcontractors, suppliers or dellverymen, cause damage to the Project or the property of 
Contractor, the Subcontractor shall promptly remedy such damage to the satisfaction of Contractor. In 
the event Subcontractor falls to remedy such damages to Contractor's satisfaction within two (2) working 
days of notice thereof from Contractor, Contractor may remedy the damage itself and deduct the cost 
thereof from such payments currently due, or thereafter to become due, the Subcontractor in accordance 
with Paragraph 19. 
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19. BACK CHARGES: Contractor shall have the right to make back charges plus a 20% administrative charge 
(the "Back Charges") to Subcontractor for damages remedied by Contractor on behalf of Subcontractor 
or for damages remedied on behalf of Subcontractor under other subcontracts with Contractor. In the 
event that the retained amount is insufficient to satisfy the Back Charge(s), Subcontractor shall pay the 
amount of the Back Charge(s) within fifteen (15) working days after Subcontractor's receipt of an invoice 
thereof. 
Prior to the execution of this agreement, the Contractor had a portion of work, which is included in the 
contract amount and Subcontractor scope of work (see exhibit B attached hereto), performed by another 
contractor on a 'Time and Materials" basis. Subcontractor (Shamrock) shall be responsible for both 
function of and payment for said work. 
20. INSURANCE: Subcontractor shall maintain at is sole cost and expense and with insurers reasonably 
approved by Contractor, during the entire term of this Subcontract: 
20.1 Statutory Worker's Compensation insurance; and 
20.2 Comprehensive general liability Insurance, with limits of at least $1,000,000 per person per accident, 
and at least $1,000,000 property damage, or Combined Single Limit of at least $2,000,000, 
aggregate consisting of both bodily injury and property damage coverage, and including products 
liability coverage and contractual liability expressly covering, without limitation, all of Subcontractor's 
obligations, including, but not limited, to the following: premises/operations, products/completed 
operations, owners/ contractors protective, independent contractors, blanket contractual liability, 
broad form property damage, automobile, and personal injury. In the event the Contract Documents 
require higher coverage or additional coverages then Subcontractor agrees to provide such higher 
and additional coverages as are required in the Contract or Contract Document of the Contractor. 
20.3 Contractor, and its personnel, shall be named as additional insureds under the comprehensive 
general liability policy and the Workman's Compensation Insurance. The policy shall stipulate that 
the insurance afforded the additional Insured shall apply as primary insurance, and that any other 
insurance carried by Contractor, its officers, directors, and employees will be excess only and will 
not contribute to Subcontractor's insurance. 
20.4 Subcontractor's Certificate of Insurance shall indicate that the Subcontractor's Insured coverage 
includes Residential Construction Operations. 
20.5 Waiver of Subrogation: Subcontractor shall obtain from each of its insurers a waiver of subrogation 
on Commercial General Liability in favor of Contractor and Owner with respect to Losses arising out 
of or In connection with the work. 
20.6 Certificates of insurance acceptable to the contractor shall be filed with the Contractor prior to 
commencement of the Subcontractor's Work. These certificates and the insurance policies 
required by this agreement shall contain a provision that coverage afforded under the policies will 
• not be canceled or allowed to expire until at least 30 days prior written notice has been given to the 
Contractor. If any of the foregoing insurance coverages are required to remain In force after final 
payment and are reasonably available, an additional certificate evidencing continuation of such 
coverage shall be submitted with the final application for payment as required In paragraph 5. If the 
insurer does not furnish any information concerning reduction of coverage, the Subcontractor shall 
furnish it with reasonable promptness according to the Subcontractor's information and belief. 
• 20.7 The Contractor shall furnish to the Subcontractor satisfactory evidence of insurance required of the 
Contractor under this agreement. ^ . ^ 
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20.8 No acceptance of Insurance certificates by Contractor shall in any way limit or relieve Subcontractor 
of its duties and responsibilities. 
21. SUBCONTRACTORS INDEMNITY: Subcontractor agrees to indemnify, defend and hold harmless 
Contractor, Including Its officers, agents, employees, subsidiary companies, architect and owners, and 
each of them (individually "Indemnified Part/' and collectively, the "Indemnified Parties") from and against 
any and all claims, causes of action, liabilities, losses, costs, damages and/or expenses in law or equity 
(including, without limitation, attorney's tees and expenses) of every kind and nature whatsoever 
(collectively, the "Claim") regardless of types or amounts of insurance carried by Subcontractor arising 
out of or in connection with this Subcontract, the Work hereunder, or any other work performed by 
Subcontractor arising out of this contract, and arising out of any act or omission to act or willful 
misconduct by Subcontractor, anyone directly or indirectly employed by Subcontractor, or anyone for 
whose acts Subcontractor may be liable, regardless of any concurrent negligence whether active or 
passive, primary or secondary, by any other entity. 
22. COMPLIANCE WITH LAWS: Subcontractor agrees to be bound by all applicable federal, state and local 
laws, orders, rules and regulations, including, but not limited to, federal, state and local tax laws, social 
security act, unemployment compensation acts, workers' compensation acts, OSHA, the Toxic Substance 
Control Act, the Fair Labor Standards Act, as applicable, Equal Employment Opportunity Act and the rules 
and regulations Issued pursuant thereto which are hereby incorporated by reference in this Subcontract 
Agreement. Subcontractor agrees to indemnify, defend and hold harmless Contractor and its customers 
from any liability, loss or damage arising out of Subcontractor's failure to so comply. 
23. SAFETY AND SITE RULES AND REGULATIONS: Subcontractor shall be responsible to report In writing 
to the Contractor any safety hazards on the Site that it becomes aware of in accordance with Exhibit "C" 
- Project Safety Program. Subcontractor shall take all necessary steps .to maintain good order and 
professional conduct of its employees, agents, and subcontractors. Subcontractor agrees to be bound 
by the Site Rules and Regulations and Safety Procedures as may be posted on the Site. In order to 
maintain communication on job site, each subcontractor shall procure, at Subcontractor's sole expense, 
and as designated by Contractor, a mobile phone and/or a radio compatible with Contractor's radio 
frequencies. 
24. DISPUTE RESOLUTION: Subcontractor agrees to strictly adhere to the requirements of any provisions 
in the General Contract Documents relating to notice, submission, processing and resolution of claims 
or disputes. Any and all claims or disputes not specifically covered elsewhere in this Agreement arising 
out of or relating to this Agreement or breach thereof shall be decided, at the sole discretion of Contractor, 
either by submission to (1) arbitration In according with the Construction Industry Arbitration Rules of the 
American Arbitration Association or (2) Judicial decision by the Third District Court of Summit County; 
provided however, the determination by Owner, the Engineer, Architect, or any Court, Board of Arbitration 
or any tribunal pursuant to the provisions of the General Contract Documents with respect to any dispute 
or claim relating to this Agreement or the Work performed or to be performed hereunder shall be binding 
upon Subcontractor, and Subcontractor agrees to accept such determination, provided Subcontractor 
shall have been given reasonable notice of such dispute, proceeding or litigation and an opportunity to 
defend or present claims. At the sole discretion of Contractor, any arbitration with Subcontractor shall be 
consolidated with any other arbitration proceeding relating to the work under the General Contract. The 
parties agree to waive their rights to trial by jury', 
25. GOVERNING LAW: The laws of the state of Utah shall govern the terms of this Subcontract Agreement 
and any resulting contract disputes. 
26. WAIVER: The provisions of this Subcontract Agreement requiring written notice may not be waived 
by oral agreement, act, or failure to act or object, by Contractor. No restriction, condition, obligation or 
provision of this Subcontract Agreement shall be deemed to have been abrogated, or waived, by reason 
of any failure or failures to enforce by Contractor. Subcontractor hereby acknowledges and agrees that 
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no individual employee of Contractor has the authority either express, implied or apparent, to waive the 
notice provisions set forth In this Agreement with respect to the making of claims for additional 
compensation, time extensions, or otherwise. Any such written notice must be delivered In the time 
required by this Agreement and cannot be waived except by a written waiver executed by an individual 
authorized by the President of Contractor. 
27. SEVERABILITY: The invalidity of any one or more paragraphs, subparagraphs, phrases, sentences or 
sections hereof shall not affect the remaining portions of this Subcontract or any part thereof. In the event 
that any portion or portions of this Subcontract should be deemed invalid or should operate to render this 
Subcontract invalid, this Subcontract shall be construed as if such paragraphs, subparagraphs, phrases, 
sentences or sections thereof had not been included in the Subcontract. 
28. ADDITIONAL PROVISIONS: 
28.1 Exhibits Contract Document List, dated May 20,2004 
28.2 Exhibit "B" Subcontract Specific Provisions, dated May 20,2004 
. 28.3 Exhibit "Cw Project Specific Safety Program, dated May 20,2004 
28.4. Shamrock Plumbing will contract with Stewart's Heating and Refrigeration as its HVAC . 
subcontractor to perform HVAC work under the subcontract scope of work. Shamrock is 
responsible for coordinating the complete installation of ail HVAC and plumbing, to provide a 
complete and operational system. The contractor will look to Shamrock for completion of the 
entire scope of work; both Plumbing and HVAC. Quality of installation, system functionality and 
warranty of the entire HVAC system is the responsibility of the primary Subcontractor 
(Shamrock). 
29. ENTIRE AGREEMENT: This Subcontract Agreement constitutes the entire agreement of the parties, and 
may not be modified or amended except in writing. Parol evidence shall not be admitted in interpretation 
of the provisions of this Subcontract Agreement. 
DATED as first above written. 
Contractor: 





(Contractor's State License No.) 
s-oiukVi- $$6 / 
(Contractor's State License No.) 
Sr. Vice President Initial: DAE 
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E-603 Panel Board Schedules 
E-701 Electrical Details 
E-702 Electrical Details 
Prepared By; BNA Consulting Engineers 
06/30/2003 N/A 12/16/2003 
06/30/2003 4 04/23/2004 
06/30/2003 4 04/23/2004 
02/06/2004 4 04/23/2004 
02/06/2004 4 04/23/2004 
02/06/2004 4 04/23/2004 
02/06/2004 * 4 04/23/2004 
02/06/2004 4 04/23/2004 
02/06/2004 4 04/23/2004 
02/06/2004 4 04/23/2004 
02/06/2004 4 04/23/2004 
' 02/06/2004 4 04/23/2004 
02/06/2004 4 04/23/2004 
02/06/2004 4 04/23/2004 
02/06/2004 4 04/23/2004 
02/06/2004 4 04/23/2004 
02/06/2004 4 04/23/2004 
02/06/2004 4 04/23/2004 
02/06/2004 4 04/23/2004 
02/06/2004 4 04/23/2004 
02/06/2004 4 04/23/2004 
02/06/2004 4 04/23/2004 
02/06/2004 4 04/23/2004 
02/06/2004 4 04/23/2004 
. 02/06/2004 4 04/23/2004 
02/06/2004 • 4 - 04/23/2004 
04/23/2004 4 04/23/2004 
02/06/2004 4 04/23/2004 
02/06/2004 4 04/23/2004 
• n 
MECHANICAL DRAWINGS - Prepared By: 
"MFTIOO Mechanical Basement Level Plan - Block-outs 
P-001 Plumbing Legend & Schedules 
P-100 Underfloor Basement Plumbing Plan 
M-001 Legend, Abbreviations & Index 
M-100 Mechanical Basement Floor Plan 
M-101 Mechanical / Plumbing Level 1 Floor Plan 
M-102 Mechanical / Plumbing Level 2 Floor Plan 
M-103 Mechanical / Plumbing Level 3 Floor Plan 
M-104 Mechanical / Plumbing Level 4 Floor Plan 
M-105 Mechanical Roof Plan 
M-106 Snow Melt Plan 
M-201 Chilled and Heating Water Piping Schematics 
M-202 Natural Gas Schematic 
M-203 Piping Schematics 
M-204 Plumbing Isometric 
M-401 Mechanical / Plumbing Enlarged Plan 
M-402 Mechanical / Plumbing Enlarged Plan 
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M-403 Mechanical / Plumbing Enlarged Plan 
M-404 Mechanical / Plumbing Enlarged Plan 
M-405 Mechanical / Plumbing Enlarged Plan 
M-406 Mechanical / Plumbing Enlarged Plan 
M-407 Mechanical / Plumbing Enlarged Plan 
M-408 Mechanical / Plumbing Enlarged Plan 
M-409 Mechanical / Plumbing Enlarged Plan 
M-410 Mechanical / Plumbing Enlarged Plan 
M-411 Mechanical / Plumbing Enlarged Plan 
M-412 Mechanical / Plumbing Enlarged Plan 
M-501 Mechanical Details 
M-502 Mechanical Details 
M-601 Mechanical Schedules 
M-602 Plumbing Schedules 
M-701 Mechanical Specifications 
M-702 Mechanical Specifications 
M-703 Mechanical Specifications 
M-704 Mechanical Specifications 
M-705 Mechanical Specifications 





























































SOILS REPORT - Prepared By: AMEC Earth & Environmental, Inc. 
Job No. 3-817-004428 06/30/2003 N/A 
Geotechnical Investigation 
N/A 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT: (Please initial and return with Subcontract Agreement) 
Subcontractor: -£&. 
Contractor: /f*— DAE 
0050 
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EXHIBIT "B" 
DAEDALUS USA, INC. 
SUBCONTRACT SPECIFIC PROVISIONS 
May 20, 2004 
JOB NAME: Lodges at Deer Valley - Building F 
JOB NO.: 1422 
PHASE CODE: 15-011 
SUBCONTRACTOR: Shamrock Plumbing, LLC 
CONTRACT NO.: 1422-08 
The following is a general description of portions of the Contract Documents, together with any deviations 
therefrom or additions thereto, which apply to the Subcontract Work to be performed by Subcontractor. 
The Subcontractor is responsible for all of the Subcontract Work that appears in the Contract Documents, 
whether or not Included in the following description, unless specifically excluded herein. Subcontractor 
acknowledges that the contract amount includes all items necessary for the completion of work as 
designed: 
I. GENERAL REQUIREMENTS: 
1. In addition to Subcontractor's other duties under the Subcontract Agreement, Subcontractor 
shall; 
a. Submit with it's proposed schedule the time required to prepare and approve shop 
drawings, to fabricate and deliver materials and equipment, and to install the Subcontract 
Work. 
b. Furnish Contractor within thirty (30) days of execution of this Agreement a list of major 
material and equipment suppliers required for the Subcontract Work, including name, 
address, and telephone number of the supplier and the date on which such material and 
equipment is expected to be delivered to the Site. 
c. Cause a qualified supervisory representative (while Subcontractor has personnel at the 
Project site and for two (2) weeks prior thereto) to attend weekly progress meetings. 
Furthermore, and not withstanding anything in this Subcontract Agreement to the contrary, 
Subcontractor agrees to be bound by such modifications to the Project Schedule as are 
discussed at the weekly progress meetings unless written objection is made by 
Subcontractor within forty-eight (48) hours of the occurrence of such meeting. 
d. Subcontractor shall provide scheduling and coordination of all Inspections pertaining to the 
Subcontract Work. Subcontractor must designate and have present Individuals, as 
required, to schedule,. coordinate, and achieve all required inspections. Subcontractor 
must also notify the Contractor, within two (2) hours of inspection visits, of the outcome of 
the inspection. Subcontractor will be responsible for all re-inspection fees and penalties 
associated with Subcontract Work. 
2. Use of Contractor's tools: Subcontractor shall not use Contractor's tools without-prior 
approval from Contractor. If Subcontractor utilizes Contractor's tools or equipment, 
Subcontractor shall do so at its own risk. In the event that one or more of Contractor's 
personnel operate said tools or equipment to assist Subcontractor in performing the 
Subcontract Work, said personnel shall be employees of Subcontractor for all purposes while 
so operating said tools or equipment, whether or not such personnel are placed on 
Subcontractor's payroll. 
3. Submittals: Subcontractor shall submit to the Contractor for approval all shop drawings, 
product data and samples for all work, material and equipment required by the Contract 
Documents, including any amendments or modifications thereto. By submitting these, 
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SUBCONTRACT SPECIFIC PROVISIONS 
May 20, 2004 
measurements and field construction criteria and has checked and coordinated the information 
with the requirements of the Subcontract Work and the Contact Documents. Approval by the 
Architect or Contractor of any submittal by Subcontractor does not relieve Subcontractor from 
responsibility for errors or omissions in any such submittals and or from any deviation from the 
requirements of the Contract Documents. Subcontractor is strictly responsible for any additional 
costs to it or others resulting in any way from use of nonspecified material or equipment. 
4. Occupancy: Whenever it may be useful or necessary for Contractor to do so, Contractor or 
Owner shall be permitted to occupy and use any portion of the Subcontract Work which has 
been either partially or fully completed by Subcontractor before final inspection and acceptance 
thereof by Owner. Such use or occupation shall not relieve Subcontractor of Its guarantee of 
said Subcontract Work nor of its obligation to correct/repair/replace, at its own expense, any 
defect in materials and workmanship that may occur or develop. 
5. Hazard Communication Standard: Prior to the start of the Subcontract Work, Subcontractor 
shall furnish Contractor's Project Superintendent with Hazardous Material Safety Data Sheets 
(MSDS) for all Subcontractor furnished materials. 
6. Parking: Parking for Subcontractor's employees shall be located in an area designated by 
Contractor's Project Superintendent. 
7. Safety Meetings: Subcontractor shall conduct weekly safety meetings with its on-site 
employees and provide Contractor's Project Superintendent with safety meeting documentation. 
8. Layout: Subcontractor shall provide all layout engineering from main control lines and a 
benchmark provided by Contractor. 
9. Cleanup: Subcontractor shall perform continuous cleanup of the Subcontract Work area, 
including removal of all rubble, boxes, crates, cartons and any other debris generated by 
Subcontractor on a dally basis. Cleanup debris shall be placed in on-site trash containers 
provided by Contractor. Subcontractor shall leave its work area(s) broom" clean at the end of 
each day. Should Subcontractor fail to perform cleanup as defined herein, the Contractor shall, 
after a written two working day notice, have the right to perform the required cleanup for 
Subcontractor and deduct all associated costs for such services from the Subcontract Amount 
in accordance with Paragraph 17 of the Subcontract Agreement. Subcontractor shall remove 
all debris materials classified as hazardous from the Site and dispose of them in accordance 
with all federal, state and local laws. Subcontractor shall not dispose of any hazardous 
materials in Contractor's on-site trash containers. 
10. Schedule: Subcontractor warrants that it has reviewed the Contract Schedule attached as 
Exhibit "D", and affirms that it has included all costs necessary in the Subcontract Price to 
comply with this schedule. If the Subcontractor fails to commence, perform, finish or deliver 
parts of the Subcontract Work in accordance with the Contract Schedule, Contractor has the 
right to, upon two working day's notice, to furnish additional labor materials and equipment at 
Subcontractor's sole cost and expense and if such labor is not available, Contractor shall have 
the right to require Subcontractor, at Subcontractor's sole cost and expense, to work overtime 
or multiple shifts (and/or weekends and holidays) to such extent as, in Contractor's opinion, Is 
necessary to accelerate and complete the Subcontract Work in accordance with the Contract 
Schedule. 
11. Overtime: Overtime authorized for reimbursement by Contractor shall be chargeable at actual 
expense of the premium portion of the labor only, plus legally applicable labor taxes and fringes. 
'h .2^-> »AE 
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May 20,2004 
No markup for overhead and profit will be allowed on the premium portion of overtime. All other 
overtime shall be at Subcontractor's sole expense. 
12. Time and Material: In any case where time and material, hourly rate or overtime work is 
authorized by Contractor, Subcontractor shall be responsible to obtain time sheets and material 
delivery records signed on a daily basis by Contractor. Subcontractor shall include a copy of 
signed time sheets and material delivery records with its request for a Subcontract Change 
Order to the Contractor. No payment will be made for time and material, hourly rate or overtime 
work performed by Subcontractor without prior approval by Contractor and Contractor signed 
time sheets and material delivery records. 
13. Back Charges: Should the Subcontractor default or neglect to carry out the Subcontract Work 
in accordance with the Contract Documents, including the terms and conditions of this 
Subcontract Agreement, and fails to within two working days after receipt of written notice from 
Contractor to commence and continue correction of such default or neglect with diligence and 
promptness. The Contractor shall have the right, without prejudice to any other remedy 
Contractor may have, to take any action necessary to correct such deficiencies. In such case 
an appropriate deductive Subcontract Change Order shall be prepared and issued to 
Subcontractor for all costs and damages Incurred by Contractor for correcting such deficiencies, 
including a twenty (20%) percent administrative charge. If the payments then, or thereafter, due 
Subcontractor are not sufficient to cover such deductive amount, the Subcontractor shall pay 
. the difference to Contractor within fifteen (15) working days after Subcontractor's receipt of an 
invoice thereof. 
ii. INCLUSIONS: 
1.. Provide all labor, materials, equipment, tools, incidentals and supervision required to furnish 
and Install HVAC and Plumbing and all other appurtenances required for a complete installation 
in accordance with the Contract Documents, applicable codes and governing agencies. 
• a SUBCONTRACT AMOUNT: 
Phase Description 
05-011 Plumbing Work 
05-011 Stewart's Heating 
05-011 Additional inclusions 
Permits and fees 
Fire Caulking and Stopping 
Concrete coring and patching 
Total Subcontract Amount: $ 1,119,083.00 
2. The Subcontractor shall provide all required plumbing and HVAC work for a complete system 
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May 20,2004 
a. Furnish and install all fixtures and piping, including, but not limited to: water heater, water 
softener, toilets, sinks, shower pans, tubs, washer hookups, faucets, floor drains, hose 
bibs, drain piping, vent piping, and supply piping. 
b. Subcontractor shall provide a floor drain by laundry facilities and water heater. 
c. Subcontractor to connect the water heater to the gas line. The gas line is to be provided by • 
others. 
d. Subcontractor to connect the dishwasher to the plumbing. 
e. Subcontractor shall provide all trenching required for their work. 
f. Subcontractor shall provide all block outs and sleeves through floors, walls, and ceilings 
required for their work. 
g. Subcontractor shall coordinate with the framing Subcontractor for location and size of all 
required backing for the plum bing. 
h. Subcontractor shall furnish and install fire stops, fire retardant compound and/or safing to 
seal all of the Subcontractor's penetrations through fire-rated assemblies, 
i. Subcontractor shall furnish all pipe flashings and sheet metal Jacks for their work. Pipe 
flashings and sheet metal jacks are to be Installed by others, 
j . Furnish and install all equipment required to complete the HVAC system, including, but not 
limited to: furnace, fan coil unit, and air conditioning unit. 
k. Furnish and install all required ducting, including, but not limited to: ducting, supply 
registers," return-air grills, combustion air ducting, and weather caps. 
I. Furnish and install smoke dampers as required by code or by the Contract Documents, 
m. Furnish and install ducting for clothes dryer. i 
n. Furnish and install ducting to all exhaust fans. Exhaust fans provided by electrician. i 
o. Furnish and install a set back thermostat and all required low-voltage wiring. Provide | 
temporary thermostats for use during construction. | 
p. XXX I 
q. Furnish and Install all refrigerant lines. Provide protection from nail puncher for all lines, 
r. Furnish and install all condensate drain lines and piping for all mechanical equipment, 
s. Furnish and install all natural gas lines Including gas .line service to gas ranges, gas dryers, 
gas fireplaces, and water heater. j 
• t. Subcontractor to connect gas dryer and gas ranges to gas lines after appliance installation. > 
u. XXX. 
v. Subcontractor shall furnish all pipe flashings and sheet metal jacks for their work. Pipe 
flashings and sheet metal jacks are to be Installed by others, 
w. Subcontractor shall provide all block outs and sleeves through floors, walls, and ceilings 
required for their work. 
x. Subcontractor shall coordinate with the framing Subcontractor for location and size of all 
required backing for the HVAC. 
y. Subcontractor shall furnish and Install fire stops, fire retardant compound'and/or safing to 
seal all of the Subcontractor's penetrations through fire-rated assemblies, 
z. Subcontractor will provide all layout and drilling of holes for penetrations through the 
concrete on metal deck, 
aa. Subcontractor will provide fastening system for horizontal fan coil units, General Contractor 
will provide framed rough opening of. " • 
bb. Furnish and install Access panels. 
cc. Subcontractor shall be responsible for fire caulking of all plumbing and mechanical 
penetrations through rated walls, ceilings, and floors, 
dd. Subcontractor shall be responsible for coordination of its requirements with the structural 
steel drawings. Includes fire stops, fire retardant compound and/ or having to seal all of the 
Subcontractor's penetrations through fire-rated construction as required, 
ee. Furnish and install specified labeling, stenciling, tagging and identification of work included 
in this subcontract. 
DAE 
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ff. Subcontractor to perform flushing, start-up, testing, and balancing of its systems as 
specified, 
gg. Subcontractor to seal all penetrations, 
hh. Subcontractor will provide all gas flex hose connections where necessary for gas 
connections at fireplace, range, etc. 
ii. Subcontractor will responsible for caulking around toilet base, sinks, and fixtures to provide 
a finish product, 
j). Subcontractor shall perform all low voltage electrical control wiring required for the 
temperature controls and Instrumentation, 
kk. Subcontractor shall furnish and install any miscellaneous iron shown on the mechanical 
drawings, or required for completion of Subcontractor's Work which is not shown on the 
Architectural or Structural Drawings. 
II. Subcontractor shall be responsible for lifting and hoisting of it's own materials or equipment, 
mm. Subcontractor will be responsible for coordination with the chimney vent cap installer 
(Stewarts) to provide adequate vent pipe at chimney vents, 
nn. Include all prime and lot finish painting of plumbing work and equipment If it is specifically 
required by the contract documents to be performed by the plumbing contractor. 
oo. All clamps, hangers, supports, wires and seismic anchorage for all work in this subcontract. 
pp. All drains to be set at required heights and to be taped or protected, in some manner as to 
• not allow construction debris or grout from the Tile Installation process to enter the waste 
water system. Floor drains must be polished at completion of Plumbing Finish Trim, 
qq. Subcontractor shall provide removal, repair, capping off, re-routing of existing services 
where required for connection to and interface with existing work, 
rr. Subcontractor will be responsible for Mechanical Sound and Vibration Control as listed In 
project documents, 




1. Chiller Line from Building E to Building F 
2. All Fireplace venting is bid for direct vent. 
IV. UNIT PRICES: 
V. ALTERNATES: 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT: (Please initial and return with Subcontract Agreement) 
Subcontractor 
Contractor: /v
 D A j , 
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DAEDALUS USA, INC. 
PROJECT SPECIFIC SAFETY PROGRAM 
May 20, 2004 
JOB NAME: Lodges at Deer Valley - Building F 
JOB NO: 1422 
PHASE CODE: 15-011 
SUBCONTRACTOR: Shamrock Plumbing 
CONTRACT NO.: 1422-08 
The Contractor's Project Superintendent shall be in charge of all safety requirements and regulations on 
the project site. Contractor shall provide Subcontractor a copy of Contractor's Project Safety Program. 
Subcontractor shall comply with the following: 
1. Subcontractor shall comply with all Federal Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSHA) and Utah 
Occupational Safety and Health Act (UOSHA) rules and regulations, including Hazard 
Communication Standards and the requirement to provide the appropriate Material Safety Data 
Sheets (MSDS). 
2. Subcontractor shall be solely responsible for all fines, penalties and costs resulting from safety 
violations on the Subcontract Work. 
3. Subcontractor shall comply with Contractor's Project Safety Program dated February 20, 2001 
(attached) and cooperate with Contractor's field supervisors to prevent or eliminate conditions that 
could result in personal injury. 
4. Subcontractor shall furnish and maintain all safety equipment required in the execution of the 
Subcontract Work. 
5. Hard hats shall be worn at all times as required by OSHA and UOSHA. 
6. Subcontractor shall provide Contractor an accident report for any accident that results in either 
personal injury or property damage. 
7. Individuals who do not comply with Contractor's Project Safety Program will be asked to leave the 
project site. Repeated safety violations, or refusal to comply with the Safety Program is cause for 
termination of this Subcontract Agreement. 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT: (Please initial and return with Subcontract Agreement) 
— DAE Subcontractor: OJ2 
Contractor: /f*—* 0056 
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WARRANTY/ GUARANTEE FOR Daedalus-USA 
We, the undersigned do hereby warranty and guarantee that the parts'of the work described above which 
we have furnished and/or installed for: 
The Lodges At Deer Valley 
• Park City, UT 
Is in accordance with the contract documents and that all said work as installed will fulfill or exceed all of 
the warranty and guarantee requirements. We agree to repair or replace work installed by us, together with 
any adjacent work which is displaced or damaged by so doing, that proves to be defective in workmanship, 
material or operation within aperiod of one (1) year from the date of final acceptance of the entire work by 
the Owner, ordinary wear and tear and unusual neglect or abuse expected. 
In the event of our failure to comply with the above mentioned conditions within a reasonable time period 
determined by the Owner, after notification in writing, we, the undersigned, all collectively and separately 
hereby authorize the Owner to have said defective work repaired and /or replaced and made good and agree 
to pay the Owner upon demand all monies that were expended in making good said defective work, 
including ail collection costs and reasonable attorney fees. 
PROJECT SUBSTANTIAL COMPLETION DATE: December 18,2004 
Date: April 8,2005 
Contractor: Shamrock Plumbing LLC. 
Representative/Title: 
State License Number: 5034847-5501 
LOCAL REPRESENTATIVE: For maintenance, repair or replacement services contact: 
Name: Bill Payne 
Address: 340 West 500 North, North Salt Lake, UT 84054 . 
Phone #: 801-295-1690 
DAE 
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West's Utah Code Annotated Currentness 
State Court Rules 
* ! Utah Rules of Civil Procedure (Refs & Annos) 
*H Part V. Depositions and Discovery 
••RULE 26. GENERAL PROVISIONS GOVERNING DISCOVERY 
(a) Required disclosures; Discovery methods. 
(a)(1) Initial disclosures. Except in cases exempt under subdivision 
(a)(2) and except as otherwise stipulated or directed by order, a party 
shall, without awaiting a discovery request, provide to other parties: 
(a)(1)(A) the name and, if known, the address and telephone number 
of each individual likely to have discoverable information supporting its 
claims or defenses, unless solely for impeachment, identifying the 
subjects of the information; 
(a)(1)(B) a copy of, or a description by category and location of, all 
discoverable documents, data compilations, electronically stored 
information, and tangible things in the possession, custody, or control 
of the party supporting its claims or defenses, unless solely for 
impeachment; 
(a)(1)(C) a computation of any category of damages claimed by the 
disclosing party, making available for inspection and copying as under 
Rule 34 all discoverable documents or other evidentiary material on 
which such computation is based, including materials bearing on the 
nature and extent of injuries suffered; and 
(a)(1)(D) for inspection and copying as under Rule 34 any insurance 
agreement under which any person carrying on an insurance business 
may be liable to satisfy part or all of a judgment which may be entered 
in the case or to indemnify or reimburse for payments made to satisfy 
the judgment. 
Unless otherwise stipulated by the parties or ordered by the court, the 
disclosures required by subdivision (a)(1) shall be made within 14 
days after the meeting of the parties under subdivision (f). Unless 
otherwise stipulated by the parties or ordered by the court, a party 
joined after the meeting of the parties shall make these disclosures 
within 30 days after being served. A party shall make initial disclosures 
based on the information then reasonably available and is not excused 
from making disclosures because the party has not fully completed the 
investigation of the case or because the party challenges the 
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sufficiency of another party's disclosures or because another party has 
not made disclosures. 
(a)(2) Exemptions. 
(a)(2)(A) The requirements of subdivision (a)(1) and subdivision (f) do 
not apply to actions: 
(a)(2)(A)(i) based on contract in which the amount demanded in the 
pleadings is $20,000 or less; 
(a)(2)(A)(ii) for judicial review of adjudicative proceedings or rule 
making proceedings of an administrative agency; 
(a)(2)(A)(iii) governed by Rule 65B or Rule 65C; 
(a)(2)(A)(iv) to enforce an arbitration award; 
(a)(2)(A)(v) for water rights general adjudication under Title 73, 
Chapter 4; and 
(a)(2)(A)(vi) in which any party not admitted to practice law in Utah is 
not represented by counsel. 
(a)(2)(B) In an exempt action, the matters subject to disclosure under 
subpart (a)(1) are subject to discovery under subpart (b). 
(a)(3) Disclosure of expert testimony. 
(a)(3)(A) A party shall disclose to other parties the identity of any 
person who may be used at trial to present evidence under Rules 
702, 703, or 705 of the Utah Rules of Evidence. 
(a)(3)(B) Unless otherwise stipulated by the parties or ordered by the 
court, this disclosure shall, with respect to a witness who is retained or 
specially employed to provide expert testimony in the case or whose 
duties as an employee of the party regularly involve giving expert 
testimony, be accompanied by a written report prepared and signed by 
the witness or party. The report shall contain the subject matter on 
which the expert is expected to testify; the substance of the facts and 
opinions to which the expert is expected to testify; a summary of the 
grounds for each opinion; the qualifications of the witness, including a 
list of all publications authored by the witness within the preceding ten 
years; the compensation to be paid for the study and testimony; and a 
listing of any other cases in which the witness has testified as an 
expert at trial or by deposition within the preceding four years. 
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(a)(3)(C) Unless otherwise stipulated by the parties or ordered by the 
court, the disclosures required by subdivision (a)(3) shall be made 
within 30 days after the expiration of fact discovery as provided by 
subdivision (d) or, if the evidence is intended solely to contradict or 
rebut evidence on the same subject matter identified by another party 
under paragraph (3)(B), within 60 days after the disclosure made by 
the other party. 
(a)(4) Pretrial disclosures. A party shall provide to other parties the 
following information regarding the evidence that it may present at 
trial other than solely for impeachment: 
(a)(4)(A) the name and, if not previously provided, the address and 
telephone number of each witness, separately identifying witnesses 
the party expects to present and witnesses the party may call if the 
need arises; 
(a)(4)(B) the designation of witnesses whose testimony is expected to 
be presented by means of a deposition and, if not taken 
stenographically, a transcript of the pertinent portions of the 
deposition testimony; and 
(a)(4)(C) an appropriate identification of each document or other 
exhibit, including summaries of other evidence, separately identifying 
those which the party expects to offer and those which the party may 
offer if the need arises. 
Unless otherwise stipulated by the parties or ordered by the court, the 
disclosures required by subdivision (a)(4) shall be made at least 30 
days before trial. Within 14 days thereafter, unless a different time is 
specified by the court, a party may serve and file a list disclosing (i) 
any objections to the use under Rule 32(a) of a deposition designated 
by another party under subparagraph (B) and (ii) any objection, 
together with the grounds therefor, that may be made to the 
admissibility of materials identified under subparagraph (C). 
Objections not so disclosed, other than objections under Rules 
402 and 403 of the Utah Rules of Evidence, shall be deemed waived 
unless excused by the court for good cause shown. 
(a)(5) Form of disclosures. Unless otherwise stipulated by the parties 
or ordered by the court, all disclosures under paragraphs (1), (3) and 
(4) shall be made in writing, signed and served. 
(a)(6) Methods to discover additional matter. Parties may obtain 
discovery by one or more of the following methods: depositions upon 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
oral examination or written questions; written interrogatories; 
production of documents or things or permission to enter upon land or 
other property, for inspection and other purposes; physical and mental 
examinations; and requests for admission. 
(b) Discovery scope and limits. Unless otherwise limited by order of 
the court in accordance with these rules, the scope of discovery is as 
follows: 
(b)(1) In general. Parties may obtain discovery regarding any matter, 
not privileged, which is relevant to the subject matter involved in the 
pending action, whether it relates to the claim or defense of the party 
seeking discovery or to the claim or defense of any other party, 
including the existence, description, nature, custody, condition, and 
location of any books, documents, or other tangible things and the 
identity and location of persons having knowledge of any discoverable 
matter. It is not ground for objection that the information sought will 
be inadmissible at the trial if the information sought appears 
reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. 
(b)(2) A party need not provide discovery of electronically stored 
information from sources that the party identifies as not reasonably 
accessible because of undue burden or cost. The party shall expressly 
make any claim that the source is not reasonably accessible, 
describing the source, the nature and extent of the burden, the nature 
of the information not provided, and any other information that will 
enable other parties to assess the claim. On motion to compel 
discovery or for a protective order, the party from whom discovery is 
sought must show that the information is not reasonably accessible 
because of undue burden or cost. If that showing is made, the court 
may order discovery from such sources if the requesting party shows 
good cause, considering the limitations of subsection (b)(3). The court 
may specify conditions for the discovery. 
(b)(3) Limitations. The frequency or extent of use of the discovery 
methods set forth in Subdivision (a)(6) shall be limited by the court if 
it determines that: 
(b)(3)(A) the discovery sought is unreasonably cumulative or 
duplicative, or is obtainable from some other source that is more 
convenient, less burdensome, or less expensive; 
(b)(3)(B) the party seeking discovery has had ample opportunity by 
discovery in the action to obtain the information sought; or 
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(b)(3)(C) the discovery is unduly burdensome or expensive, taking 
into account the needs of the case, the amount in controversy, 
limitations on the parties' resources, and the importance of the issues 
at stake in the litigation. The court may act upon its own initiative 
after reasonable notice or pursuant to a motion under Subdivision (c). 
(b)(4) Trial preparation: Materials. Subject to the provisions of 
Subdivision (b)(5) of this rule, a party may obtain discovery of 
documents and tangible things otherwise discoverable under 
Subdivision (b)(1) of this rule and prepared in anticipation of litigation 
or for trial by or for another party or by or for that other party's 
representative (including the party's attorney, consultant, surety, 
indemnitor, insurer, or agent) only upon a showing that the party 
seeking discovery has substantial need of the materials in the 
preparation of the case and that the party is unable without undue 
hardship to obtain the substantial equivalent of the materials by other 
means. In ordering discovery of such materials when the required 
showing has been made, the court shall protect against disclosure of 
the mental impressions, conclusions, opinions, or legal theories of an 
attorney or other representative of a party concerning the litigation. 
A party may obtain without the required showing a statement 
concerning the action or its subject matter previously made by that 
party. Upon request, a person not a party may obtain without the 
required showing a statement concerning the action or its subject 
matter previously made by that person. If the request is refused, the 
person may move for a court order. The provisions of Rule 37(a)(4) 
apply to the award of expenses incurred in relation to the motion. For 
purposes of this paragraph, a statement previously made is (A) a 
written statement signed or otherwise adopted or approved by the 
person making it, or (B) a stenographic, mechanical, electrical, or 
other recording, or a transcription thereof, which is a substantially 
verbatim recital of an oral statement by the person making it and 
contemporaneously recorded. 
(b)(5) Trial preparation: Experts. 
(b)(5)(A) A party may depose any person who has been identified as 
an expert whose opinions may be presented at trial. If a report is 
required under subdivision (a)(3)(B), any deposition shall be 
conducted within 60 days after the report is provided. 
(b)(5)(B) A party may discover facts known or opinions held by an 
expert who has been retained or specially employed by another party 
in anticipation of litigation or preparation for trial and who is not 
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expected to be called as a witness at trial, only as provided in Rule 
35(b) or upon a showing of exceptional circumstances under which it is 
impracticable for the party seeking discovery to obtain facts or 
opinions on the same subject by other means. 
(b)(5)(C) Unless manifest injustice would result, 
(b)(5)(C)(i) The court shall require that the party seeking discovery 
pay the expert a reasonable fee for time spent in responding to 
discovery under Subdivision (b)(5) of this rule; and 
(b)(5)(C)(ii) With respect to discovery obtained under Subdivision 
(b)(5)(A) of this rule the court may require, and with respect to 
discovery obtained under Subdivision (b)(5)(B) of this rule the court 
shall require, the party seeking discovery to pay the other party a fair 
portion of the fees and expenses reasonably incurred by the latter 
party in obtaining facts and opinions from the expert. 
(b)(6) Claims of Privilege or Protection of Trial Preparation Materials. 
(b)(6)(A) Information withheld. When a party withholds information 
otherwise discoverable under these rules by claiming that it is 
privileged or subject to protection as trial preparation material, the 
party shall make the claim expressly and shall describe the nature of 
the documents, communications, or things not produced or disclosed 
in a manner that, without revealing information itself privileged or 
protected, will enable other parties to assess the applicability of the 
privilege or protection. 
(b)(6)(B) Information produced. If information is produced in 
discovery that is subject to a claim of privilege or of protection as trial-
preparation material, the party making the claim may notify any party 
that received the information of the claim and the basis for it. After 
being notified, a party must promptly return, sequester, or destroy the 
specified information and any copies it has and may not use or disclose 
the information until the claim is resolved. A receiving party may 
promptly present the information to the court under seal for a 
determination of the claim. If the receiving party disclosed the 
information before being notified, it must take reasonable steps to 
retrieve it. The producing party must preserve the information until 
the claim is resolved. 
(c) Protective orders. Upon motion by a party or by the person from 
whom discovery is sought, accompanied by a certification that the 
movant has in good faith conferred or attempted to confer with other 
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affected parties in an effort to resolve the dispute without court action, 
and for good cause shown, the court in which the action is pending or 
alternatively, on matters relating to a deposition, the court in the 
district where the deposition is to be taken may make any order which 
justice requires to protect a party or person from annoyance, 
embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense, including 
one or more of the following: 
(c)(1) that the discovery not be had; 
(c)(2) that the discovery may be had only on specified terms and 
conditions, including a designation of the time or place; 
(c)(3) that the discovery may be had only by a method of discovery 
other than that selected by the party seeking discovery; 
(c)(4) that certain matters not be inquired into, or that the scope of 
the discovery be limited to certain matters; 
(c)(5) that discovery be conducted with no one present except persons 
designated by the court; 
(c)(6) that a deposition after being sealed be opened only by order of 
the court; 
(c)(7) that a trade secret or other confidential research, development, 
or commercial information not be disclosed or be disclosed only in a 
designated way; 
(c)(8) that the parties simultaneously file specified documents or 
information enclosed in sealed envelopes to be opened as directed by 
the court. 
If the motion for a protective order is denied in whole or in part, the 
court may, on such terms and conditions as are just, order that any 
party or person provide or permit discovery- The provisions of Rule 
37(a)(4) apply to the award of expenses incurred in relation to the 
motion. 
(d) Sequence and timing of discovery. Except for cases exempt 
under subdivision (a)(2), except as authorized under these rules, or 
unless otherwise stipulated by the parties or ordered by the court, a 
party may not seek discovery from any source before the parties have 
met and conferred as required by subdivision (f). Unless otherwise 
stipulated by the parties or ordered by the court, fact discovery shall 
be completed within 240 days after the first answer is filed. Unless the 
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court upon motion, for the convenience of parties and witnesses and in 
the interests of justice, orders otherwise, methods of discovery may be 
used in any sequence and the fact that a party is conducting 
discovery, whether by deposition or otherwise, shall not operate to 
delay any other party's discovery. 
(e) Supplementation of responses. A party who has made a 
disclosure under subdivision (a) or responded to a request for 
discovery with a response is under a duty to supplement the disclosure 
or response to include information thereafter acquired if ordered by 
the court or in the following circumstances: 
(e)(1) A party is under a duty to supplement at appropriate intervals 
disclosures under subdivision (a) if the party learns that in some 
material respect the information disclosed is incomplete or incorrect 
and if the additional or corrective information has not otherwise been 
made known to the other parties during the discovery process or in 
writing. With respect to testimony of an expert from whom a report is 
required under subdivision (a)(3)(B) the duty extends both to 
information contained in the report and to information provided 
through a deposition of the expert. 
(e)(2) A party is under a duty seasonably to amend a prior response to 
an interrogatory, request for production, or request for admission if 
the party learns that the response is in some material respect 
incomplete or incorrect and if the additional or corrective information 
has not otherwise been made known to the other parties during the 
discovery process or in writing. 
(f) Discovery and scheduling conference. 
The following applies to all cases not exempt under subdivision (a)(2), 
except as otherwise stipulated or directed by order. 
(f)(1) The parties shall, as soon as practicable after commencement of 
the action, meet in person or by telephone to discuss the nature and 
basis of their claims and defenses, to discuss the possibilities for 
settlement of the action, to make or arrange for the disclosures 
required by subdivision (a)(1), to discuss any issues relating to 
preserving discoverable information and to develop a stipulated 
discovery plan. Plaintiffs counsel shall schedule the meeting. The 
attorneys of record shall be present at the meeting and shall attempt 
in good faith to agree upon the discovery plan. 
(f)(2) The plan shall include: 
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(f)(2)(A) what changes should be made in the timing, form, or 
requirement for disclosures under subdivision (a), including a 
statement as to when disclosures under subdivision (a)(1) were made 
or will be made; 
(f)(2)(B) the subjects on which discovery may be needed, when 
discovery should be completed, whether discovery should be 
conducted in phases and whether discovery should be limited to 
particular issues; 
(f)(2)(C) any issues relating to preservation, disclosure or discovery of 
electronically stored information, including the form or forms in which 
it should be produced; 
(f)(2)(D) any issues relating to claims of privilege or of protection as 
trial-preparation material, including—if the parties agree on a 
procedure to assert such claims after production—whether to ask the 
court to include their agreement in an order; 
(f)(2)(E) what changes should be made in the limitations on discovery 
imposed under these rules, and what other limitations should be 
imposed; 
(f)(2)(F) the deadline for filing the description of the factual and legal 
basis for allocating fault to a non-party and the identity of the non-
party; and 
(f)(2)(G) any other orders that should be entered by the court. 
(f)(3) Plaintiffs counsel shall submit to the court within 14 days after 
the meeting and in any event no more than 60 days after the first 
answer is filed a proposed form of order in conformity with the parties' 
stipulated discovery plan. The proposed form of order shall also 
include each of the subjects listed in Rule 16(b)(l)-(8), except that the 
date or dates for pretrial conferences, final pretrial conference and trial 
shall be scheduled with the court or may be deferred until the close of 
discovery. If the parties are unable to agree to the terms of a 
discovery plan or any part thereof, the plaintiff shall and any party 
may move the court for entry of a discovery order on any topic on 
which the parties are unable to agree. Unless otherwise ordered by the 
court, the presumptions established by these rules shall govern any 
subject not included within the parties' stipulated discovery plan. 
(f)(4) Any party may request a scheduling and management 
conference or order under Rule 16(b). 
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(f)(5) A party joined after the meeting of the parties is bound by the 
stipulated discovery plan and discovery order, unless the court orders 
on stipulation or motion a modification of the discovery plan and order. 
The stipulation or motion shall be filed within a reasonable time after 
joinder. 
(g) Signing of discovery requests, responses, and 
objections. Every request for discovery or response or objection 
thereto made by a party shall be signed by at least one attorney of 
record or by the party if the party is not represented, whose address 
shall be stated. The signature of the attorney or party constitutes a 
certification that the person has read the request, response, or 
objection and that to the best of the person's knowledge, information, 
and belief formed after reasonable inquiry it is: (1) consistent with 
these rules and warranted by existing law or a good faith argument for 
the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law; (2) not 
interposed for any improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause 
unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation; and 
(3) not unreasonable or unduly burdensome or expensive, given the 
needs of the case, the discovery already had in the case, the amount 
in controversy, and the importance of the issues at stake in the 
litigation. If a request, response, or objection is not signed, it shall be 
stricken unless it is signed promptly after the omission is called to the 
attention of the party making the request, response, or objection, and 
a party shall not be obligated to take any action with respect to it until 
it is signed. 
If a certification is made in violation of the rule, the court, upon motion 
or upon its own initiative, shall impose upon the person who made the 
certification, the party on whose behalf the request, response, or 
objection is made, or both, an appropriate sanction, which may include 
an order to pay the amount of the reasonable expenses incurred 
because of the violation, including a reasonable attorney fee. 
(h) Deposition where action pending in another state. Any party 
to an action or proceeding in another state may take the deposition of 
any person within this state, in the same manner and subject to the 
same conditions and limitations as if such action or proceeding were 
pending in this state, provided that in order to obtain a subpoena the 
notice of the taking of such deposition shall be filed with the clerk of 
the court of the county in which the person whose deposition is to be 
taken resides or is to be served, and provided further that all matters 
arising during the taking of such deposition which by the rules are 
required to be submitted to the court shall be submitted to the court in 
the county where the deposition is being taken. 
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( i) Filing. 
( i ) ( l ) Unless otherwise ordered by the court, a party shall not file 
disclosures or requests for discovery with the court, but shall file only 
the original certificate of service stating that the disclosures or 
requests for discovery have been served on the other parties and the 
date of service. Unless otherwise ordered by the court, a party shall 
not file a response to a request for discovery with the court, but shall 
file only the original certificate of service stating that the response has 
been served on the other parties and the date of service. Except as 
provided in Rule 30(f)(1), Rule 32 or unless otherwise ordered by the 
court, depositions shall not be filed with the court. 
(i)(2) A party filing a motion under subdivision (c) or a motion under 
Rule 37(a) shall attach to the motion a copy of the request for 
discovery or the response which is at issue. 
CREDIT(S) 
[Effective May 2, 2005; amended effective November 1, 2007; 
November, 2008.] 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
